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ARTICLES
REVOKING AN AGGRESSOR'S LICENSE TO KILL
MILITARY FORCES SERVING THE UNITED NATIONS:
MAKING DETERRENCE PERSONAL
WALTER GARY SHARP, SR.*
Every subject's duty is the king's; but every subject's soul is his
own.
William Shakespeare
HENRY VI
[T]he killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in interna-
tional and national law, only where the war is legal. But where
the war is illegal . .. there is nothing to justify the killing, and
these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other
lawless robber band.
Sir Hartley Shawcross
before the Nuremberg Tribunal
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I. AN AGGRESSOR'S LICENSE TO KILL
The aggressive use of force by a state is a crime against peace that
has been outlawed by the international community.3Accordingly, interna-
tional law imputes individual criminal responsibility for a crime against
peace; i.e., the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the ac-
complishment of any of the foregoing .... "4 The punishment of those
who are involved in a crime against peace through the aggressive use of
force, however, is limited to individuals who operate at a policy-decision
level of the aggressor state.- Combatants of the aggressor state who kill
in furtherance of an unlawful use of force have absolute and complete
immunity so long as they kill enemy combatants in accordance with the
jus in bello, i.e., the laws of armed conflict that govern the actual con-
duct of hostilities.6
3. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 111 (Bruno
Simma ed., 1994); NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 85, 369-70 (John Norton Moore et al. eds.,
1990); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112, 154
(1963).
4. See, e.g., Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 911, 914 (Die-
trich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988).
5. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 3, at 369-70, which quotes the
opinion of the International Military Tribunal in United States v. Leeb et al. (The High
Command Case):
If and as long as a member of the armed forces does not participate in the prep-
aration, planning, initiating, or waging of aggressive war on a policy level, his
war activities do not fall under the definition of crimes against peace.
Id. at 370 (quoting United States v. Leeb et al., 11 TRIALS AND WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 488, 489 (1948)). See also Comments of the ILC
on the Seven Nuremberg Principles, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 116, 117,
U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in SYDNEY D. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS
IN WAR 163, 168 (1972).
6. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 3, at 359-60, 371-73. The so-called
combatants' privilege during times of war has been explained as follows:
War consists largely of acts that would be criminal if performed in time of
peace-killing, wounding, kidnapping, and destroying or carrying off other peo-
ple's property. Such conduct is not regarded as criminal if it takes place in the
course of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity over the
warriors.
Id. at 359 (quoting TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM 19-20 (1970)). See also
3 CUMuLATIVE DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1981-88, at 3457-60
(Marian Nash (Leich) ed., 1995) [hereinafter CUMULATIVE DIGEST]. As Edward R. Cum-
mings has stated:
It is well accepted under the Geneva Conventions and customary international
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This immunity that grants combatants of an aggressor state the li-
cense to kill is rooted in the doctrine of equal application, which will be
explored in detail in Part II of this Article. This doctrine provides that
the jus in bello apply to all state parties of an armed conflict regardless
of whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception under the
jus ad bellum, i.e., the laws that govern the resort to war.7 When this
doctrine is applied in its historical context of wars between states, its in-
tended purpose remains intact and reflects sound public policy. When the
Security Council of the United Nations [hereinafter Security Council],
however, authorizes Member States8 to use armed force to maintain inter-
national peace and security, the doctrine of equal application makes it
lawful for the combatants of an aggressor state to kill an unlimited num-
ber of individuals authorized by the international community to enforce
international law on its behalf. The rote application of this doctrine in the
contemporary context of United Nations military operations reflects poor
public policy, as demonstrated by the reluctance of the international com-
munity over the last decade to apply this doctrine to actions taken by and
under the authority of the United Nations. Part III of this Article will
chronicle this reluctance through an evolution of international law and
state practice that reveals a marked decline in the application of the doc-
trine of equal application to military activities conducted by and under
the authority of the United Nations.
law that individuals who are entitled to prisoner-of-war status may not be prose-
cuted for legitimate acts of war, including the killing of enemy personnel in
battle. They may, however, be prosecuted for violations of the law of war (e.g.,
mistreating prisoners of war, willfully attacking noncombatants, misusing the
Red Cross emblem).
Id. at 3459. The U.S. Department of the Navy defines combatants as follows:
[Combatants are] those persons who have the right under international law to
participate directly in armed conflict during hostilities. Combatants, therefore,
include all members of the regularly organized armed forces of a party to the
conflict (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defense personnel, and mem-
bers of the armed forces who have acquired civil defense status), as well as ir-
regular forces who are under responsible command and subject to internal mili-
tary discipline, carry their arms openly, and otherwise distinguish themselves
clearly from the civilian population.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAvy, NWP 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAvAL OPERATIoNs 5.3 (1995) [hereinafter COMMANDER's HANDBOOK]. "Belligerents"
are specifically those combatants of a nation that is a party to an ongoing international
armed conflict. Id. 7.1.
7. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW, supra note 3, at 371-73.
8. Throughout the present Article, the term "Member States" refers to states that are
members of the United Nations.
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To allow the combatants of an aggressor state furthering unlawful
aggression to maintain this immunity vis-a-vis the United Nations is a
failure of system-wide deterrence that undermines collective self-defense,
which is the most fundamental tenet of the Charter of the United Nations
[hereinafter Charter]. Wars are not fought by some state entity or solely
by those who operate at a policy-decision level, but by the individual
members of the armed forces of a state. Effective deterrence demands
that any person who commits a crime against peace, or kills in further-
ance of that international crime, should be held accountable therefor and
punished. To be effective, deterrence must be personalized to those indi-
vidual combatants who make the illegal act of aggression possible. Deter-
rence, and its role in war avoidance, will be discussed in Part IV.
When applied in the context of collective self-defense authorized by
the Security Council, the doctrine of equal application is an anachronism,
i.e., military forces, acting under the authority of the United Nations are
international policemen and should be unlawful targets under all circum-
stances.9 Part V of this Article discusses this concept of international law
enforcement, and analyzes the legal and practical consequences of revok-
ing an aggressor's license to kill. Parts 1I through IV of this Article are
then woven together in Part V to define a new modality of personal de-
terrence that will strengthen the rule of law by extending the criminality
of aggression beyond the senior leadership of a state to encompass all of
those persons who kill in furtherance of an illegal use of force. Such an
exception to the doctrine of equal application is supported by interna-
tional precedent as well as previous attacks on the doctrine that chal-
lenged its application to military forces serving the United Nations. This
limited exception is also carefully crafted to ensure that it can be fairly
9. See generally Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of International
Peace and Security, 7 DUKE J. Coue'. & INT'L L. 93 (1996). The cited article analyzes the
existing legal protections accorded military forces operating outside their flag state. It
prepares the foundation for an exception to the doctrine of equal application and the con-
ceptual framework for the present Article by setting forth the proposition that all military
forces acting under the authority of the United Nations, whether non-belligerent or bellig-
erent, should be unlawful targets under all circumstances. The cited article also offers a
"Draft Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Civilians and Military Forces operating under the authority of the
United Nations (Protocol Ill)" to advance and codify this protection. See also MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21-22, 62 (1977). Walzer analyzes the moral tension
between the jus ad bellun and the jus in bello now that aggressive war has become a
crime, stating that "[t]he dualism of jus ad bellurn and jus in bello is at the heart of all
that is most problematic in the moral reality of war." Id. at 21. In his legalist paradigm,
Walzer concludes that aggression justifies "a war of law enforcement by the victim and
any other member of international society." Id. at 62.
19981
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applied to the combatants of an aggressor state. This new modality
makes it a crime for any person to knowingly attack military forces serv-
ing under the authority of the United Nations-whether these forces are
non-belligerent observer missions as during the First United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Sinai desert or belligerent forces such
as the coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War.
The international community has already declared that all civilians
and non-belligerent military forces serving under the direction of the
United Nations are protected persons and unlawful targets.'0 This pro-
tected status includes coercive peace-keepers such as those in Somalia,
Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, i.e., non-belligerent military forces that
have been authorized by the Security Council under its Chapter VII au-
thority to use military force to accomplish a limited mandate short of
stopping an aggressor or imposing a cessation of hostilities." This Article
carves out an exception to the doctrine of equal application by extending
this protected status to belligerent military forces that are authorized by
the Security Council to fight aggression. The social, moral, and legal un-
derpinning of this extension is the conviction that military forces which
enforce international law should be treated and protected as international
policemen, and should be unlawful targets under all circumstances. Mili-
tary forces who defend the international community under the authority
of the United Nations are not the moral equivalent of combatants of an
aggressor state, and should not be treated as their legal equivalent. Rec-
ognizing that customary international law is constantly evolving, the time
has come for the international community to embrace a new tenet of in-
ternational humanitarian law stating that military forces who serve under
the authority of the Security Council are international policemen and are
unlawful targets under all circumstances.
II. THE DocrRINE OF EQUAL APPLICATION
War has existed during the entire history of human society.12 Indeed,
a study in 1968 calculated "that there had been only 268 years free of
war in the previous 3,421 [years]."' 13 From the organized food-gathering
and wife-seeking raids of primitive man to the Persian Wars of the fifth
10. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Dec.
9, 1994, art. 2, G.A. Res. 49/59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 141, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/59 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995).
11. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 105-07.
12. See RICHARD A. PRESTON & SYDNEY F. WISE, MEN IN ARMS: A HISTORY OF
WARFARE AND ITS INTERRELATIONSHIPS WITH WESTERN SOcIETY 1 (4th ed. 1979).
13. DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE 4
(1995).
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century B.C. and the Second World War of the twentieth century, 4 war
was accepted as a legitimate form of violence. 5 Motives for war were
wide-ranging, and included the acquisition of territory, the domination of
another people, the access to scarce resources, and the search for glory,
prestige, and revenge.' 6 Other motivations included the desire to pillage,
rape, and murder because war was simply a culture and a way of life for
some people such as the Cossacks. 7 In many respects, war simply began
as organized armed robbery by plundering hordes among dissimilar peo-
ples and tribes.18
A. Jus ad bellum
Virtually every recorded civilization developed some rules governing
the initiation of war. 9 The Egyptians and the Sumerians developed rudi-
mentary jus ad bellum during the second millennium B.C.20 As a general
rule, the Hittites of the fourteenth century B.C. formally exchanged let-
ters and demands before commencing hostilities. 2' During the approxi-
mate period 335 B.C. to 1800, war was examined on a moral, philosoph-
ical level whereby war was approved if the cause was just.22 This
philosophy of war as an instrument of justice was replaced in the early
1800s by the acceptance of war as a political instrument of national
policy. 23
The Prussian philosopher and military theorist General Karl von
Clausewitz is often quoted as describing war as the continuation of na-
tional policy by other means.24 Two fundamental tenets of Clausewitz's
14. See PRESTON & WISE, supra note 12, at 8, 19, 295.
15. See id. at 5-14.
16. See id. at 6.
17. See JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 7-9 (1993).
18. See KOrZScH. supra note 2, at 25.
19. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (Leon Friedman ed.,
1972).
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. NATIONAL SECURrIY LAW, supra note 3, at 51-57.
23. Id. at 57. The development of the law of conflict management can be divided
into six approximate time periods: (1) just war, 335 B.C. to A.D. 1800; (2) war as fact,
1800-1918; (3) early League of Nations, 1919-1925; (4) Kellogg-Briand Pact and late
League, 1928-1945; (5) early United Nations Charter, 1945-1958; and (6) contemporary
Charter, 1959-present. Id. at 51.
24. See, e.g., KEEGAN, supra note 17, at 3. While noting that variations of the con-
cept that war is the continuation of policy by other means are frequently quoted, Keegan
challenges the simplicity of the translation. As Keegan explains, the original German ex-
presses a more subtle and complex idea that "war is the continuation 'of political inter-
1998]
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philosophy are the legitimacy of war as a normal phase in the relations
among states and the absolute sovereignty of states.25 Both of these tenets
were soundly rejected by the international community in 1945 when it
adopted the Charter.26 The aggressive use of force is now clearly prohib-
ited by Article 2(4) of the Charter.21 Furthermore, while state sovereignty
remains the most basic constitutional doctrine of state relations under in-
ternational law,21 absolute sovereignty no longer exists. Article 2(7) of
the Charter explicitly recognizes the Chapter VII enforcement authority
of the Security Council in matters essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state, and Article 39 imposes an obligation on the Security
Council to either make recommendations or decide what measures shall
be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.29 It is in
this context of Clausewitz's thinking, however, that one can best under-
stand the evolution of the doctrine of equal application.
The laws of conflict management, i.e., the jus ad bellum, are those
rules that govern the resort to armed conflict and determine whether the
conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception. 3° Until the early-1900s,
states were free to resort to war at any time and their freedom to do so
was expressly recognized in international agreements.31 The first restric-
tions on the freedom to resort to war began with the Hague Peace Con-
ferences of 1899 and 1907, but no arrangement explicitly made the ag-
course' . . . 'with the intermixing of other means.' " Id. See also NATIONAL SECURITY
LAW, supra note 3, at 57 ("War is only a part of political intercourse.... War is nothing
but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means ...Accord-
ingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse. ... (quoting KARL vON
CLAusEwrrz. ON WAR 402 (A. Rapoport ed. 1832)) (ellipses in original)); U.S. MARINE
CoRus, FMFM 1, WARFIGHTING 19 (1989) ("War does not exist for its own sake. It is an
extension of policy with military force."). General Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)
served as the director of the war College in Berlin from 1818 to 1830 where he began his
work on his 3-volume masterpiece, ON WAR, which was published posthumously in 1832.
See Karl von Clausewitz, MICROSOFT ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia,
1994).
25. See CLAUSEWITZ ON WAR 63-64 (Anatol Rapoport ed., 1968).
26. The Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945, in San Fran-
cisco, California, and entered in force on October 24, 1945. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 12.
27. See, e.g., id. at 111; NATIONAL SECuRITY LAW, supra note 3, at 85, 369-70;
BROWNLiE, supra note 3, at 112, 154.
28. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (3d ed.
1979).
29. U.N. CHARaER art 2, para 7, art. 39.
30. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 2-3 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff
eds., 2d ed. 1989).
31. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
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gressive use of force unlawful until the Article 2(4) prohibition in the
Charter.32 Articles 2(4), 39, and 51 of the Charter now codify the con-
temporary jus ad belium in their entirety.33
These Articles must be read together to determine the scope and
content of the Charter's prohibition on the aggressive use of force and
the responsibility of the Security Council to enforce this prohibition. Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by any state
except in individual or collective self-defense as authorized by interna-
tional law and recognized by Article 51 of the Charter.34 Specifically, Ar-
ticles 2(4) and 51 provide:
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following
Principles: ...
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.35
As an exercise of the international community's inherent right of collec-
tive self-defense, Article 39 of the Charter imposes an obligation on the
Security Council to maintain international peace and security:
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
32. See id. at 109-11.
33. See id. at 111.
34. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 3, at 85.
35. U.N. CRARTER art. 2, para 4, art. 51.
1998]
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international peace and security.3
Decisions taken by the Security Council under Article 39 are binding on
all Member States. 37 Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to "de-
cide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be em-
ployed to give effect to its decisions,"38 and Article 42 authorizes the Se-
curity Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.' 39 Arti-
cle 42 includes the authority for the Security Council to conduct or au-
thorize belligerent operations against an aggressor state, and to deploy or
authorize the deployment of an armed force in the territory of an aggres-
sor state without that state's consent, when such actions are necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.4°
B. Jus in bello
The laws of war, i.e. the jus in bello, also commonly referred to as
the laws of armed conflict, govern the actual conduct of hostilities and
have developed as customary international law through the practice of al-
most all societies over thousands of years-from the era of the Greeks and
Romans to the Middle Ages and the twentieth century.41 During the
fourth century B.C., the Hindu civilization of India produced a book of
rules that governed land warfare that prohibited, for example, the use of
poisoned or barbed weapons, and the killing of those belligerents who
are asleep, naked, disarmed, or grievously wounded.42 The jus in bello of
the ancient Hebrews, that are set forth in Deuteronomy 20, required the
ancient Hebrews to spare trees of the field but allowed them to kill every
man, woman, and child of their immediate enemies. 43
In these early times war was waged "with all the unalleviated cru-
elty of which human fiendishness is capable."" To mitigate this sav-
agery, reciprocal restraints on the conduct of war were believed advanta-
geous and became common as the means and methods of warfare
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
37. U.N. CHARTER arL 25. See also THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: A COM-
MENTARY, supra note 3, at 407-18.
38. U.N. CHARTER arL 41.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
40. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
632-35.
41. See DOcuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 1-2; 1 THE LAW OF
WAR. A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 3.
42. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 3.
43. See id. at 4.
44. MoRRis GREENsPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3 (1959).
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became more destructive. 45 Such self-imposed restraints became so uni-
versally observed that they gradually became legally binding customs of
war, and offenders were punishable as war criminals. 6 In the seventeenth
century, a Dutch lawyer, Hugo Grotius, compiled and recorded these cus-
toms of war in his seminal three-volume work entitled, DE JURE BEL
AC PACIs LiBRi TRES (ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PAcE).4 7 As the "most
comprehensive attempt to bring together both classical and medieval
thought on war," these volumes are considered the "starting point for the
study and development of the modem law of war."' ' Appropriately, Gro-
tius is now regarded as the "father of modem international law."4'
Although belligerents are lawful targets, the most fundamental cus-
tomary tenet of the existing jus in bello is that the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.s° From this tenet,
customary international law has derived two corollary principles: "pro-
portionality," which seeks to establish criteria for limiting the use of
force; and "discrimination," which governs the selection of methods,
weaponry, and targets.51 These two principles of proportionality and dis-
crimination have been refmed in military usage to three interrelated cus-
tomary principles of international law: military necessity, humanity, and
chivalry.52 Since the customary jus in bello developed as self-imposed,
45. See id. at 4.
46. id.
47. See 1 THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 14;
GREENsPAN, supra note 44, at 4. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was
(a] Dutch jurist, humanist, and statesman, whose legal writings laid the founda-
tion for modem international law...- [H]e began the practice of law [in 15991.
In 1607 he was appointed attorney general of the province of Holland. [His]
. . . first published work on international law, MARE LmIERUM (THE FREE SEA,
1609), challenged the right of any nation to claim any part of the open sea as
exclusively its own. Such a claim, Grotius argued, was against natural law and
the basic law of humanity. He took the same line of argument in his DE JURE
BELI AC PAcis (ON THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE, 1625): that war violates nat-
ural law, which applies to the conduct of nations and of individuals. His conten-
tion was that war can be condoned only if it is for a righteous cause and concil-
iation has failed, and he called for humanitarian limits on such warfare.
Hugo Grotius, MfICROSOFr ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1994).
48. 1 THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 14.
49. GREENSPAN, supra note 44, at 4.
50. See DoCUMENS ON THE LAwS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 4. This principle is
codified in Article 22 of the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex (Regulations), 36 Stat. 2295, 1 Bevans 643, reprinted
in DocuMENTs ON THE LAws OF WAR, supra note 30, at 48.
51. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAws OF WAR, supra note 30, at 5.
52. See id. (referring to the definitions of these three terms in the CommAN 's
HANDBOOK). The COMMANDER's HANDBOOK defines these three customary principles of
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advantageous restraints designed to mitigate the savagery of war,53 they
were never intended to impede the waging of hostilities.5 4 To the con-
trary, the jus in bello complement and support "the principles of warfare
embodied in the military concepts of objective, mass, economy of force,
surprise, and security." 55
While the customary jus in bello continue to exist independently, the
practice of codifying the jus in bello in binding international agreements
began in the nineteenth century with the 1856 Paris Declaration on Mari-
time War.-6 Following the Paris Declaration, codification accelerated at
the turn of the twentieth century.57 Since that time, the jus in bello have
generally developed in two regimes: the Hague regulations that govern
the means and methods of warfare, and the Geneva conventions that gov-
ern the protection of victims of war.58
international law as follows:
Military necessity: "Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise pro-
hibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete sub-
mission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical
resources may be applied."
Humanity: "The employment of any kind or degree of force not required
for the purpose of the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a mini-
mum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited."
Chivalry: "Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedients, and
dishonorable conduct during armed conflict are forbidden."
CoMMANDER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, 5.2.
53. See GREENSPAN. supra note 44, at 4.
54. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, 5.2.
55. Id.
56. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 2-4.
57. See id. at 3.
58. See generally id. Nevertheless, despite the development of these extensive re-
gimes and the threat of prosecution, barbaric cruelty remains a characteristic of twentieth
century warfare. One study commissioned in 1913 by the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace recorded the atrocities among the Turks, Serbs, and Greeks during the Bal-
kan war that ended in the early twentieth century. The International Carnegie Commission
put on record these statements by Greek soldiers:
"These soldiers all state that everywhere they burned the Bulgarian villages.
Two boast of the massacre of prisoners of war. One remarks that all the girls
they met with were violated. Most [sic] the letters dwell on the slaughter of
noncombatants, including women and children.
"Here we are burning the villages and killing the Bulgarians, both women and
children.
"We picked out their eyes (five Bulgarian prisoners) while they were still
alive ....
From Kukush to the Bulgarian frontier the Greek Army devastated the villages,
violated the women and slaughtered the noncombatant men."
United States v. List, 11 TRLAIS OF WAR CmNMALs BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MIUrARY
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Most notable of the regime of Geneva conventions are the four Ge-
neva Conventions of 1949 developed at the initiative of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).59 These four conventions apply dur-
ing international armed conflict and deal with the following four catego-
ries of victims of war, respectively: wounded and sick in armed forces in
the field; wounded, sick and ship-wrecked in armed forces at sea; prison-
ers of war; and civilians.6° The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are ad-
hered to by more states than any other agreements on the laws of armed
conflict and are declaratory of customary international law.6'
These conventions are linked by certain general principles and by
common articles that are found throughout each of the four conven-
TRmUNALS 757, 1219 (1950) (ellipsis in original). The memoirs of an English traveler
captured the demented enthusiasm exhibited by one of the Serbian combatants during this
same war in the Balkans:
"From the occupied territory pitiful reports arrived about the atrocious cruelties
committed by the Serbs as well as by Montenegrins against the Albanian popu-
lation, and the conquerors boasted of their brave deeds, instead of trying to
withhold them. A Serbian officer almost choked with laughter over his glass of
beer, when he related how his people in Ljuma bayonetted women and
children."
Id. (quoting EDrm DURHAN, THE SLAv DANGER. 20 YEARs OF BALKAN MRMoRms). Even
during the war in the Balkans that began in 1992, as many as 100,000 women were taken
hostage and systematically raped in an effort to defile and impregnate them so they
would not be accepted back into their community. See Patricia Forestier, Psychiatric Ge-
nocide! How the Barbarities of 'Ethnic Cleansing' Were Spawned by Psychiatry, FREE-
DOM, May 1993, at 6, 6-11, 34-35. Other atrocities included soldiers who burned families
alive in their homes, crushed the heads of young children, and raped pregnant mothers in
front of their families. See Rod Nordland, 'Let's Kill the Muslims!', NEwSwEEK, Nov. 8,
1993, at 48, 48-49.
59. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 169. Collectively,
these four conventions are referred to as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. For the
individual conventions, see Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention No. I], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 171; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention No.
II], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 194; Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention No. I], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
TH LAwS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 216; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 272.
60. See DOCUMENTs ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 169.
61. See id. at 169-70.
14 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
tions.62 Common Article 2 governs the application of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and is widely accepted as the threshold test for
when an international armed conflict exists and, consequently, for when
the jus in bello are to apply in their entirety.63 This Article invokes the
provisions of the Conventions upon one of three factual conditions: the
declaration of war, the occurrence of "any other armed conflict" between
two or more contracting parties even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them, and in all cases of partial or total occupation even if met
with no armed resistanceP6 The existence of international armed conflict
and the corresponding application of the jus in bello in cases of declared
war65 or occupation6 are normally self-evident.
Although the terms 'war' and 'armed conflict' are frequently used
interchangeably and refer to a state of hostilities that invoke the jus in
bello, war refers to a state of de jure hostilities invoked by a formal dec-
laration of one party67 that creates an international armed conflict as a
matter of law. 6 In contrast, armed conflict refers to a state of de facto
hostilities invoked by the use of force by one party without any formal
declaration of war.69 Under exceptional circumstances, such as the inva-
sion of Kuwait by three Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command divi-
sions on August 2, 1990,70 de facto hostilities may also be self-evident.
62. See id. at 169.
63. See id. at 169-70; COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 17-21 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [here-
inafter 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV COMMENTARY].
64. See 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 59, art. 2, reprinted in Docu-
MENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 272 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV
COMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 20.
65. Although a declaration of war is not required to establish the existence of inter-
national armed conflict, such a declaration does define a legal state of armed hostilities
between states even in the absence of the use of force. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,
FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 18 (1956) [hereinafter THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE].
66. Military occupation is a question of fact that "presupposes a hostile invasion, re-
sisted or unresisted, as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government
incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader has successfully substi-
tuted its own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded." Id.
(1355.
67. See DOcUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 1-2.
68. See THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 65, 18. For an excellent historical
discussion of the evolution and meaning of de jure and de facto wars, see KOTzscH,
supra note 2, at 36-65.
69. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 1-2.
70. For a detailed account of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the response of the
international community, see U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDucT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR:
FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO TITLE V OF THE PERSIAN GULF CONFLicr Sup-
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Without such exceptional circumstances, however, determining when
"any other armed conflict" exists is a factual, subjective determination
that centers on the use of force between the members of the armed forces
of two states.
The commentary of the 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV published
by the ICRC describes the Common Article 2 threshold for de facto hos-
tilities as follows:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the in-
tervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies
the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long
the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.7'
Although not very clearly defined, this explanation depicts a low Com-
mon Article 2 threshold for the application of the Conventions designed
to afford maximum protection to non-belligerents and belligerents by en-
suring the Conventions apply to as many hostile interventions between
the members of the armed forces of two states as possible.72 This ICRC
commentary of Common Article 2 does offer, however, three criteria that
add structure to a factual analysis of the existence of de facto hostilities.
The emphasized terms '[a]ny difference,' 'no difference how long the
conflict lasts,' and 'no difference . . . how much slaughter takes place,'
provide that the scope, duration, and intensity of a use of force between
the members of the armed forces of two states are the central factors in
determining the existence of de facto hostilities. Based upon this ICRC
description of the Common Article 2 threshold, de facto hostilities exist
and the jus in bello therefore apply when any use of force-regardless of
its scope, duration, or intensity-occurs between the members of the
armed forces of two states. Although this ICRC description is intended to
create a very low threshold for the application of the jus in bello, the test
remains situational and must be applied in the context in which the use
of force between members of the armed forces of two states is actually
used. Clearly, for example, the authorized use of force by the military
PLEMENTAL AUTHORIZATION AND PERSoNNEL BENEFITS ACT OF 1991 (PUBLIC LAW 102-25)
(Apr., 1992) [hereinafter CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS].
71. 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV CoMMENTARY, supra note 63, at 20 (emphasis
added).
72. See id. at 17-21; HOWARD S. LEviE, 59 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES: PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 14-26
(1977).
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police of one state on one of its military installations to apprehend a vis-
iting member of the armed forces of another state who is intoxicated and
trespassing does not create de facto hostilities between the two states.
The United States utilizes this scope, duration, and intensity analysis
in its determination of belligerent status. On December 3, 1983, for ex-
ample, two unarmed U.S. Navy planes flying in support of the U.N.
Multinational Force in Lebanon were fired upon by Syrian anti-aircraft
guns and surface-to-air missiles.73 When the United States responded the
next day with airstrikes against the Syrian positions from which anti-
aircraft fire had come, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Robert 0. Goodman, Jr.,
was shot down and held by Syria.74 The issue of his status as a prisoner
of war under the 1949 Geneva Convention No. ImI was raised, and the
U.S. Department of State issued the following press guidance:
Question - Is the captured airman a "prisoner of war"
under the Third Geneva Convention?
Answer - Yes. The Third Geneva Convention accords "pris-
oner-of-war" status to members of the armed forces who are
captured during "armed conflict" between two or more parties to
the Convention. "Armed conflict" includes any situation in
which there is hostile action between the armed forces of two
parties, regardless of the duration, intensity or scope of the fight-
ing and irrespective of whether a state of war exists between the
two parties. The Third Convention also provides for the prompt
return of prisoners when "active hostilities" have ceased. As we
have made clear, the incident which occurred between our forces
and those of Syria has terminated, and we are hopeful that Syria
will promptly return our airman and cooperate with the Govern-
ment of Lebanon in resolving the problems of that country.7
Syria released Lieutenant Goodman on January 3, 1984.76
United States practice, however, has continued to evolve. Ten years
later, a situation similar to Lieutenant Goodman's resulted in a determi-
nation that the downed pilot was not a prisoner of war, but an unlawful
detainee. On October 3, 1993, U.S. Army Rangers operating in support
of the expanded United Nations Operations in Somalia raided a house in
Mogadishu in an attempt to arrest General Mohamed Farah Aidid for
previous attacks on United Nations personnel conducting humanitarian
73. See CuMuLATvE DIGEST, supra note 6, at 3456-57.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 3456-57.
76. See id. at 3457.
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relief operations." When the raid was over, nineteen United Nations per-
sonnel were killed, and one U.S. Army helicopter pilot, Chief Warrant
Officer 3 Michael Durant, was shot down and held by Somali clans-
men.78 The issue of his status as a prisoner of war under the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention No. H was raised, and it was determined that he was
an unlawful detainee because the United Nations operations did not rise
to the level of a de facto international armed conflict that would trigger
the jus in bello.79 Warrant Officer Durant was released on October 14,
1993.8
During its ratification process of the Chemical Weapons Convention
fourteen years after Lieutenant Goodman was declared a prisoner of war,
the United States clearly adopted a more flexible and reasonable contex-
tual approach to the application of the Common Article 2 threshold anal-
ysis. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides that "[e]ach State
Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare." 81
On April 24, 1997,82 the U.S. Senate conditioned its advice and consent
to the Chemical Weapons Convention on the requirement that:
(26) RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
(A) PERMrrTED USES. Prior to the deposit of the United States in-
strument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress
that the United States is not restricted by the Convention in its
use of riot control agents, including the use against combatants
who are parties to a conflict, in any of the following cases:
(i) UNITED STATES NOT A PARTY. The conduct of peacetime
military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict
when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such
77. See U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFO., THE UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA: 1992-1996,
at 12, 50-54, U.N. Doc. DPI/1677, U.N. Sales No. E. 96.1.8 (1996) [hereinafter THE
UNITED NATIONS AND SOMALIA]. This text is Volume VIII of the United Nations Blue
Book Series.
78. See id. at 54-55.
79. See Steven J. Lepper, The Legal Status of Military Personnel in United Nations
Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 359, 362-64 (1996).
80. See THE UNrED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 77, at 331.
81. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, art. 1, para. 5; S.
Treaty Doc. No. 21, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Con-
vention], excerpted in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW DOCUMENTS 348 (John Norton Moore et
al. eds., 1995)
82. See Helen Dewar, Senate Approves Chemical Arms Pact After Clinton Pledge,
WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1997, at Al. The Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 74 to 26.
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as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia,
Bosnia, and Rwanda).
(ii) CONSENSUAL PEACEKEEPING. Consensual peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is authorized by the re-
ceiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of
the United Nations Charter.
(iii) CHAPTER VII PEACEKEEPING. Peacekeeping operations
when force is authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.83
In response, the President's certification of April 25, 1997, pro-
vided that:
In accordance with Condition (26) on Riot Control Agents,
I have certified that the United States is not restricted by
the Convention in its use of riot control agents in various
peacetime and peacekeeping operations. These are situations
in which the United States is not engaged in a use of force
of a scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the
laws of war with respect to U.S. forces. 84
Both the Senate's condition and the President's letter explicitly recognize
the authority of military forces who serve as consensual or coercive
peace-keepers, or who are not a party to a conflict, to use force to ac-
complish their mission, even within an area of ongoing conflict against
combatants who are parties to the conflict. The President's letter also
specifically adopts the scope, duration, and intensity analysis as the U.S.
methodology for interpreting the Common Article 2 threshold and deter-
mining the belligerent status of military forces during the conduct of
peacetime military operations.
This evolution of state practice reflects the contemporary difficulty
of this factual determination interpreting the Common Article 2 threshold
for de facto hostilities. This difficulty arises because military forces are
83. S. Exec. Res. 75, 105th Cong., CONG. REc. S3378 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1997). The
Senate gave its advice and consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention subject to a to-
tal of thirty-three conditions. Id. at S3373-79.
84. President's Certifications and Report to the Congress in Connection with the
U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Apr. 25,
1997), available in White House Virtual Library <http://library.whitehouse.gov>. The
United States deposited its instrument of ratification on April 25, 1997, and the Conven-
tion entered into force on April 29, 1997, with 107 of 168 signatory states having rati-
fied. Signatory States to the Chemical Weapons Convention <http://www.opcw.nl/memstat
namelist.htm>.
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authorized to use force in self-defense 5 and to accomplish their mission
during the conduct of peacetime military operations8 6 that may occur in
an area of ongoing.8 7 These peacetime military operations include law en-
forcement, peace-keeping, humanitarian and disaster relief, counter-
terrorist, hostage rescue, and noncombatant evacuation operations.8 8 A
rote application of the Common Article 2 threshold allows a limited and
intermittent use of force to invoke a state of de facto hostilities and unin-
tentionally causes military personnel to become belligerents and lawful
targets even though they are conducting a peacetime military operation.
The lack of clarity in what level of use of force is required to trigger the
Common Article 2 threshold further compounds the difficulty of this
analysis. As a result of this unintended consequence when the Common
Article 2 threshold is applied to peacetime military operations, the inter-
national community now analyzes the use of force by the military in the
context of its assigned mission.8 9 Such a contextual analysis fleshes out
those uses of force that are below the Common Article 2 threshold that
makes a combatant force conducting a peacetime military operation a
belligerent force.
Under existing international law, therefore, the line of belligerency
is that point on the "use of force" spectrum at which international armed
conflicts begin and the jus in bello apply. This point is triggered by the
declaration of war, the occurrence of de facto hostilities, and all cases of
partial or total occupation. When combatants conducting peacetime mili-
tary operations cross the line of belligerency, they become belligerents
and lawful targets. Figure 1 graphically summarizes these principles of
existing international law.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
86. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 105; Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace-keeping Forces, 294 INT'L REV. OF
THE RED CRoss 227 (May-June 1993) excerpted in WALTER GARY SHARP. SR., UNITED
NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 145, 146 (1995).
87. Although cast as a contemporary issue, the international community was also
concerned in the early 1960s over the possibility that the United Nations peace-keeping
forces in the Congo may have become involved in hostilities that invoked the jus in
bello. See FRiNN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 60,
180 (1966).
88. See JOINT PUB 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN
WAR, 111-1 (1995).
89. See discussion infra Part Ill.
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THE COMMON ARTICLE 2 THRESHOLD
(Figure 1: © 1997 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.)
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In summary, short of an actual declaration of war or a case of occu-
pation, military forces do not become a party to an international armed
conflict until such time as they become engaged in a "use of force" of a
scope, duration, and intensity that would trigger the jus in bello with re-
spect to these forces. This threshold is a factual, subjective determination
that centers on the use of force between the members of the armed forces
of two states. These factors are to be considered conjunctively, and in the
context of the assigned mission of the forces. For example, military
forces conducting a noncombatant evacuation operation do not become a
party to an armed conflict when they use limited force to rescue person-
nel. Similarly, military forces serving under the authority of the United
Nations do not become a party to an armed conflict when they use lim-
ited force to accomplish an assigned humanitarian relief or peace opera-
tion. In contrast, individual or collective military action in response to
outright aggression, such as the coalition response to the Iraqi aggression
that led to the Persian Gulf war, does cross the Common Article 2
threshold and trigger the application of the jus in bello.
C. Evolution of the Doctrine of Equal Application
Until the seventeenth century, the jus ad bellum determined the ap-
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plication of the jus in bello,90 i.e., it determined the rules governing the
conduct of war for those parties that legitimately resorted to war.91 The
jus in bello were also regulated by the principle called "the distinction
between peoples with respect to war." 92 This principle was founded on
the fact that people are different in ways such as race, language, custom,
and religion. 93 These differences not only provided a justification for war,
but for those wars fought between dissimilar peoples, the combatants
were not required to abide by the jus in bello.94 In the ancient Greco-
Roman civilization of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., the jus in bello
applied only to a legitimate war authorized by the gods between civilized
sovereign states. 95 The jus in bello did not apply to wars fought with
barbarians, i.e., those peoples who did not live together in a society that
met the Greek standard of a civilized sovereign state.96 The Christian the-
ology of the Middle Ages interpreted this interdependence of the jus ad
bellum and the jus in bello to mean that the jus in bello applied to wars
between Christians, but not to wars between Christians and infidels.97
In Europe, the rise of the sovereign nation state in the early seven-
teenth century caused the jus ad bellum to evolve away from an analysis
of whether the war was based on a just cause, to issues addressing the
procedural mechanisms for beginning a war.9 Similarly, this evolving
equality of states also eroded the discriminatory application of the jus in
bello based upon the distinction between peoples.99 The end result of this
90. See KolZScH, supra note 2, at 85-89.
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id. at 86.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id. 25-26.
95. Id. at 27.
96. Id. at 27-28.
97. Id. at 30-38.
98. Id. at 87-89. The Peace of Westphalia is frequently credited with the birth of the
nation state system. See J. L. BRRLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 5 (Humphrey Waldock ed.,
6th ed. 1963). The Peace of Westphalia was
[a] treaty, signed October 24, 1648, that closed the Thirty Years' War and read-
justed the religious and political affairs of Europe .... The main participants
were France and Sweden and their opponents Spain and the Holy Roman Em-
pire. By the terms of the treaty, the sovereignty and independence of each state
of the Holy Roman Empire was fully recognized, making the Holy Roman em-
peror virtually powerless.... The Peace of Westphalia marked the close of the
period of religious wars. Thereafter, European armed struggles were waged
principally for political ends.
Peace of Westphalia, MicROsOFr ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia,
1994).
99. See KOScH. supra note 2, at 89.
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transition was a complete severance of the interdependence of the jus ad
bellum and jus in bello.'00
Through the influence of his 1625 treatise DE JURE BELLI AC PAcS
Lim TRtEs, Hugo Grotius is credited with having established this separa-
tion between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, i.e., "the theory of
the equal application of the jus in bello irrespective of the justice of a
party's resort to force." 10' With the evolution of state sovereignty in his
time, the principal rationale underlying Grotius' theory was the lack of
an effective method of determining the lawfulness of the aggression1 2
Accordingly, the separation of these two bodies of law was the only way
to ensure the general application of the jus in bello to all wars.103 This
doctrine of equal application remained unchallenged until the early twen-
tieth century. 104
Once the Charter outlawed aggressive war in 1945, the doctrine was
challenged on a number of occasions."' 5 However, the doctrine remains
generally accepted as a valid principle of international law. The Nurem-
berg International Military Tribunal (IMT) declared in its 1948 Hostage
trial, for example, that:
whatever may be the cause of a war that has broken out, and
whether or not the cause be a so-called just cause, the same rules
of International Law are valid as to what must not be done, may
be done, and must be done by the belligerents and neutral States.
This is so, even if the declaration of war is ipso facto a violation
of International Laws as when a belligerent declares war upon a
neutral State for refusing passage to its troops, or when a State
goes to war in patent violation of its obligations under the Cove-
nant of the League or the General Treaty for Renunciation of
war.
06
It should be noted, however, that the Hostage trial case before the Nu-
remberg IMT occurred only three years after the Charter had outlawed
the aggressive use of force and involved crimes during World War II that
occurred before the Charter became law. Bound by these facts, the judges
100. Id.
101. Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391, 396 (1993) (emphasis added). See also GREENSPAN, supra note 44, at 9.
102. See id. at 410-11.
103. See KonzscH, supra note 2, at 89.
104. See Gardam, supra note 101, at 410.
105. See discussion infra Part HI.E.
106. KorzsCH, supra note 2, at 121-22 (citation omitted).
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of the IMT declared that they had "to accept th[is] imperfect state as ex-
isting law," 1 7 when considering if the doctrine of equal application ap-
plies when a state has patently engaged in aggressive war.
Similarly, Morris Greenspan provides in his 1959 treatise on THE
MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE that:
[ilt is clear international law that however international war
breaks out, and whether the waging of that war is justifiable or
not, so long as a state of war exists the rules of war apply. 'Even
a war, illegal . . . is nevertheless . . . regulated by the laws of
war. This rule of international law is firmly established and rec-
ognized by all leading international lawyers."'0
As stated in its preface, the purpose of this treatise "is to present an ac-
curate, comprehensive, and systematic statement of the international law
of war on land as it exists today."'109
THE COMMANDER's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
an official publication adopted in 1995 by the U.S. Navy, the Marine
Corps, and the Coast Guard, also echoes this principle:
It is important to distinguish between resort to armed conflict,
and the law governing the conduct of armed conflict. Regardless
of whether the use of armed force in a particular circumstance is
prohibited by the United Nations Charter (and therefore unlaw-
ful), the manner in which the resulting armed conflict is con-
ducted continues to be regulated by the law of armed conflict."0
This publication is intended to provide commanding officers and their
staffs with an overview of existing rules of law governing naval opera-
tions in peacetime and during armed conflict."'
Finally, one scholar, Professor Christopher Greenwood, specifically
examined this issue of carving out an exception to the doctrine of equal
application for military forces serving the United Nations. He concluded:
There is considerable logical force to . . . [this] argument. The
principle that the laws of armed conflict apply equally to both
parties to an armed conflict, irrespective of who is the aggressor,
107. Id. at 122 n.147 (citation omitted).
108. GERqsPAN, supra note 44, at 9 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
109. GREENSPAN, supra note 44, at vii (emphasis added).
110. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, 5.1.
111. Id. at 21.
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is difficult to reconcile with the general legal principle ex injuria
non oritur jus .... Despite its apparent logic .... [this] theory is
a dangerous one which is open to criticism on several
grounds. . . . In particular, I believe it would not be realistic to
criminalize all acts of violence against U.N. forces or forces au-
thorized by the United Nations, in circumstances where those
forces are engaged in fighting a war. To do so would be likely to
weaken, rather than enhance, the protection which the law
affords. 2
Professor Greenwood refers to Protocol I as one basis for his criticism of
such an exception for belligerents. The Preamble to Protocol I specifi-
cally rejected the North Vietnamese suggestion that the United States was
an aggressor during the Vietnam war and therefore not entitled to benefit
from the jus in bello.113 Protocol I supplements the protections accorded
victims of international armed conflicts provided by the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, and applies in situations referred to in Common
Article 2. l14 The language of the preamble referred to by Professor
Greenwood provides:
Reaffirming further that the provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully
applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by
those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the
nature of origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused
by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict. 1 5
As the excerpts above demonstrate, the doctrine of equal application
remains a generally accepted principle among international law scholars.
These reaffirmations of the doctrine of equal application, for the most
part, are either a codification or a reflection of existing international law.
Part HI of this Article will reveal, however, an evolution in international
law and state practice not yet universally recognized as existing law that
112. Christopher Greenwood, Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime, 7
DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 185, 203-04, 207 (1996).
113. Id. at 204.
114. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, para. 3, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON TIE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 389.
115. Protocol I, supra note 114, pmbl., reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 389-90.
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identifies a de facto decline in the application of this doctrine to military
forces serving the United Nations.
D. The Application of the Doctrine to Military Forces Serving the
United Nations
The jus in bello evolved as obligations on states, and each state re-
mains responsible for the application of the laws of armed conflict when
its forces serve as belligerents under the authority of the United Na-
tions.116 The President of the ICRC addressed this issue in a memoran-
dum to Member States, and concluded that since the United Nations is
not a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, "each State is per-
sonally responsible for the application of these Conventions, when sup-
plying a contingent to the United Nations.""17 In contrast, other scholars
have concluded it "is uncontested that the United Nations is bound by
the customary rules of IHL [international humanitarian law] when en-
gaged in hostilities."" 8 The Institute of International Law has taken the
latter approach. In a 1971 resolution, the Institute concluded that:
[t]he humanitarian rules of the law of armed conflict apply to the
United Nations as of right, and they must be complied with in all
circumstances by United Nations Forces which are engaged in
hostilities. 119
Similarly, in a 1975 resolution, the Institute declared that
116. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
600.
117. Letter from Leopold Boissier, President, International Committee of the Red
Cross, to the Governments of States Party to the Geneva Conventions and Members of
the United Nations (Nov. 10, 1961), 9 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 490, 490 (Dec.
1961) (addressing the application of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 by military
units placed at the disposal of the United Nations), reprinted in SHARP, supra note 86, at
143, 144.
118. Dietrich Schindler, United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian
Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS
PRiNcUPLns 521, 526 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984), excerpted in SHARP, supra note 86,
at 152, 156.
119. Institute of International Law, Resolutions and Voeux Adopted By the Institute
at Its Zagreb Session (26 August - 3 September, 1971): . Conditions of Application of
Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May
Be Engaged, art. 2, 54-II ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 465-66
(1971), reprinted in SHARP, supra note 86, at 138, 139.
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[t]he rules of armed conflict shall apply to hostilities in which
United Nations Forces are engaged, even if those rules are not
specifically humanitarian in character.120
Regardless of whether the rationale is founded on the United Nations be-
ing bound in its own right as a juridical entity, or only through proxy of
the obligations of its constituent members, the conclusion remains that
military forces serving the United Nations must abide by international
law, including the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. This is consistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations, which provides that the United
Nations must act "in conformity with the principles of justice and inter-
national law" when taking collective measures for the prevention and re-
moval of threats to the peace and responding to acts of aggression.121
Military forces serving the United Nations generally fall into one of
three categories determined by the underlying authority upon which they
operate, and whether the force is non-belligerent or belligerent: consen-
sual peace-keepers, coercive peace-keepers, and peace-enforcers.'2 In ad-
dition to their inherent right to use armed force in self-defense,123 all mil-
itary forces are authorized to use varying levels of force to accomplish
their respective missions. Although authorized by Chapter VI of the
Charter, consensual peace-keepers are present in the territory of a sover-
eign state only because that state has consented to their presence. 24 Their
right of self-defense includes the authority to use limited force to over-
come attempts by forceful means to prevent them from discharging their
assigned mission,'2 but consensual peace-keepers are not belligerents and
are not lawful targets, even though they may be deployed into areas of
ongoing hostilities.' 26 Coercive peace-keepers are authorized by the Se-
curity Council under Chapter VII to use all necessary means, not neces-
sarily with the consent of all the parties concerned, for the purposes of a
limited mandate short of stopping an aggressor or imposing a cessation
120. Institute of International Law, Resolutions Adopted and Recommendations
Made By the Institute at Its Wiesbaden Session, (August 6-15, 1975): II. Conditions of
Application of Rules, Other Than Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict, to Hostilities in
Which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged, art. 2, 56-11 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTTUT DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 540 (1975), reprinted SHARP, supra note 86, at 141, 142.
121. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para 1.
122. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 97-112.
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
124. Sharp, supra note 9, at 105.
125. See, e.g., Palwankar, supra note 86, at 227, excerpted in SHARP, supra note 86,
at 145, 146.
126. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 105.
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of hostilities.1 7 Similarly, these forces are not considered belligerents and
are not lawful targets even though they may also be deployed into areas
of ongoing hostilities.'2 Peace-enforcers are authorized by Chapter VII of
the Charter to use all necessary means to provide for the collective secur-
ity of the international community by responding to outright aggression,
either imminent or actual. 29 Under existing international law, these forces
are belligerents in an international armed conflict and could be lawfully
targeted by the state against which the Security Council is taking en-
forcement action.130
The international community has already declared that all civilians
and non-belligerent military forces serving under the direction of the
United Nations are protected persons and unlawful targets. 131 This pro-
tected status includes consensual peace-keepers, and coercive peace-
keepers such as those in Somalia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia. 32
The international community's concern over attacks on these peace-keep-
ing forces is in direct conflict, however, with the application of the doc-
trine of equal application to military forces serving the United Nations.
The conflict arises with a rote application of the Common Article 2
threshold for the existence of an international armed conflict. As previ-
ously discussed in Part II.B, existing international law intended at its in-
ception a low threshold for when an international armed conflict exists
and when the jus in bello apply. This occurs at the line of belligerency,
which is that point on the "use of force" spectrum determined by the
declaration of war, the occurrence of de facto hostilities, and all cases of
partial or total occupation.
The application of the factual, subjective determination for de facto
hostilities for peace-keeping forces is what causes this direct conflict be-
tween the international community's desire to maximize the application
of the jus in bello and the protection for its peace-keepers. When consen-
sual and coercive peace-keepers use force in self-defense or to accom-
plish their assigned mission, they run the risk of triggering the Common
Article 2 threshold, thereby establishing an international armed conflict,
and establishing themselves as belligerents and lawful targets. This is
clearly contrary to the international community's desire to maximize pro-
tection for its peace-keepers and make them unlawful targets. Figure 2
127. Id. at 105-09.
128. Id. at 107.
129. Id. at 100-03, 109.
130. Id. at 101-02.
131. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
supra note 10, art. 2, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995).
132. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 105-07.
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graphically illustrates the continuum of existing legal protections ac-
corded these three categories of military forces serving the United Na-
tions when diagramed along the line of belligerency. This figure demon-
strates that the line of belligerency becomes a slippery slope when
applied to military forces serving the United Nations, allowing even con-
sensual peace-keepers to become lawful targets while in the performance
of their assigned duties.
CONTINUUM OF EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTION
ACCORDED MILITARY FORCES SERVING THE UNITED NATIONS
(Figure 2: © 1997 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.)
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This de facto Common Article 2 analysis creates the untenable situ-
ation that peace-keepers who begin their operation as non-belligerents
and unlawful targets may become belligerents and lawful targets when
they exercise their authority to use force either in self-defense or to ac-
complish their assigned mission. The tragic irony of this rote application
of existing international law is highlighted by considering the conclusion
of some international lawyers that peace-keepers become peace-enforcers
(and therefore lawful targets) in situations such as in Somalia when
peace-keepers use authorized force to arrest a war criminal accused of
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previously killing other peace-keepers.' Such an unacceptable conclu-
sion would allow an attacking force to determine the legality of its attack
on peace-keepers by ensuring that the scope, duration, and intensity of
the attack exceeds the Common Article 2 threshold. To prevent such un-
intended consequences, the international community has rejected such a
rote application of international law and has recognized a higher de facto
threshold for military forces serving the United Nations.' 3 '
III. THE DECLINE OF THE DocRuNE OF EQUAL APPLICATION
Heuristics is a uniquely appropriate methodology for determining the
direction of change and status of customary international law. Contempo-
rary state practice makes a distinction between military forces acting in-
dependently under the authority of a state, and those military forces serv-
ing at the behest of the international community. In the limited
circumstances of military forces serving under the authority of the United
Nations, the following case-studies reveal a de facto decline in the doc-
trine of equal application, and a modification to the Common Article 2
threshold for determining when such forces become belligerents and law-
ful targets.
A. Jus contra bellum
For four millennia, the jus ad bellum generally allowed states to en-
gage in war at any time. 135 The first attempt to place juristic restrictions
on this freedom to resort to war did not begin until the Hague Peace
Conferences of 1899 and 1907.136 Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion I[, for example, required parties to present a "previous and explicit
warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of
an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war."' 37 This was nothing
more, however, than a formal recognition that the resort to war was le-
133. See Michael D. Sandier, Recommendation and Supporting Report on the Con-
vention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 1996 A.B.A. SEC.
INT'L L. & PRAc., reprinted in 31 INT'L LAw. 195, 197 (1997).
134. See discussions supra Part l.B and infra Part ILF.
135. See discussion supra Part ll.A.
136. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
109-11. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 adopted three conventions and three decla-
rations that were signed by the delegates but never ratified by the participating states. See
THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLIcTS, supra note 4, at 49-51.
137. Hague Convention IH Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
1, 36 Stat. 2259, 1 Bevans 619, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note
4, at 57.
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gal.138 Similarly, the series of nineteen Bryan Treaties concluded by the
United States and a number of other states between 1913 and 1916 im-
posed an obligation on contracting parties to submit all of their disputes
to a conciliation commission, and not to begin hostilities prior to the
commission's report. 139
After World War I, the League of Nations also attempted to restrict
the right of states to resort to war.14° As in the Bryan Treaties, members
of the League of Nations were required to submit their disputes to judi-
cial settlement, arbitration, or to the Council of the League, and were
prohibited to begin war within a period of three months from the judicial
decision, arbitral award, or the Council's report.14' The only prohibition
on the resort to war was against any state that complied with the judicial
decision, arbitral award, or a unanimous decision of the Council. 42 The
League of Nations was unsuccessful in its attempt to prohibit or, in prac-
tice, restrict the resort to war.43 The international community attempted
to correct the shortcomings of the League of Nations by adopting the
1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes. 1"4 This Protocol prohibited the resort to war except in self-defense
or in the case of collective enforcement measures, but it never became
binding law.' 45
The decisive turning point in the history of the jus ad bellum was
the adoption of the Briand-Kellogg Pact on August 27, 1928.46 Article 1
of this Pact provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties solemnly de-
clare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse
to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as
an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."' 47
Nearly all existing states of the time became parties to the Briand-
Kellogg Pact, and it soon became customary international law.' as Despite
138. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrTED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
109.
139. Id. at 109-10.
140. Id. at 110.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Pol-
icy, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343, quoted in THE CHARTER OF THE UNrED NA-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 110.
148. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
110-11.
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its significance in principle, the Pact had its weaknesses. 14 Most notably,
it merely prohibited war and not the use of force, allowing states to en-
gage in devastating hostilities while claiming that no offenses under the
Pact were being committed- °
Article 2(4) of the Charter was the coup de grace for the theory and
practice of the jus ad belium that recognized the right of states to resort
to war. This Article requires all Member States to "refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state . . . ."151 The Charter
clearly outlaws the aggressive use of force while recognizing a state's in-
herent right of individual and collective self-defense in Article 51 and the
Security Council's obligation under Article 39 to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security.152 As previously discussed, Articles 2(4),
39, and 51 of the Charter now codify the contemporary jus ad bellum in
its entirety.153
Until the twentieth century, the relationship between the jus ad bel-
lum and jus in bello was based upon the same underlying principle of the
right of states to resort to war. 54 With the creation of the Charter norm
prohibiting the right of states to resort to war, there was a very important
change in this relationship as the contemporary concept of the jus ad bel-
lum evolved to one of the jus contra bellum, i.e., the law against war. 55
The underlying principle of the jus contra bellum has become penal
law,'56 prohibiting all aggressive use of force while retaining a state's
right of individual and collective self-defense.
Notwithstanding this severance of common, underlying principle, it
is generally accepted that the jus in bello retain their validity and binding
force under the contemporary Charter law of the jus contra bellum with
respect to all military forces regardless of the authority upon which they
act. 57 It is important to note, however, that the shift in raison d'itre for
pre-Charter and post-Charter jus in bello marks a decline in the rationale
for the doctrine of equal application with respect to military forces serv-
ing the United Nations.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 111.
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 4.
152. See discussion supra Part H.A for the text and a brief analysis of Articles 2(4),
39, and 51.
153. See THE CHARTER Op THE UNmTED NATiONS: A ComMENTARY, supra note 3, at
111.
154. See KoTzscH. supra note 2, at 83.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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The pre-Charter jus in bello were a set of humanitarian rules that
governed interstate warfare at a time when no method was available
among sovereign states to determine the justness of the war.15 The inter-
dependence of the two concepts of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello
allowed warring states to each declare their enemy unjust, and thereby
set aside the humanitarian obligations of the jus in bello. Since all states
believed their respective causes were just, the only way of ensuring the
applicability of the jus in bello was to sever its interrelationship with the
jus ad bellum.
In contrast, the underlying rationale for the application of post-
Charter jus in bello is solely the humanitarian nature of the rules, be-
cause the Charter establishes the per se rule that war and the aggressive
use of force is unjust and unlawful. 59 With the present role of the Secur-
ity Council, the rationale for Grotius' doctrine of equal application no
longer exists. In a very central way, the Charter has restored a nexus be-
tween the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello in the limited context of
military forces defending the international norm of the jus contra bellum.
A contemporary discussion by one author, Professor Judith Gail
Gardam, notes that traditional principles of the jus ad bellum have been
fundamentally changed by the Charter-system and restricted to the use of
force principles codified in the Charter.16° Professor Gardam points out
that the distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello is er-
oding in practice.' 6' In a discussion that focuses on how the international
rule of proportionality (as a component of both the jus ad bellum and the
jus in bello) has evolved under the Charter-system of conflict manage-
ment, Professor Judith Gail Gardam has made the following observations:
The jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are themselves generally
regarded as independent sets of rules and the relationship be-
tween the two has also remained largely unexplored. What debate
there has been has arisen in the context of whether the rules on
the conduct of hostilities are affected by the legality of the resort
to force. Most commentators take the position that the rules must
be applied equally, as exemplified in the Preamble to Protocol I.
Events in the recent gulf conflict demonstrate that this analysis is
too simplistic. The practice of states in that conflict reveals that
the legality of a state's resort to force has a subtle impact on the
perception by that state of the means that can legitimately be
158. See discussion supra Part B.C.
159. See Gardam, supra note 101, at 411.
160. Id. at 403.
161. Id. at 393-94.
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used to achieve its goal. Thus, in reality, the jus ad bellum to
some extent may determine the jus in bello.. . . Moreover, the
almost-unprecedented role of the Security Council in determining
the aggressor is clearly a significant factor in any analysis of
these events. 162
Since the gulf conflict, it is difficult to see how it can be argued
that the rules regulating the .conduct of armed conflict are unaf-
fected by considerations relating to the use of force.... Clearly,
as long as there is any prevailing theory of the jus ad bellum, it
will always affect the jus in bello.163
Based upon her detailed case study of the international community's re-
sponse to unlawful aggression during the Persian Gulf War, Professor
Gardam concludes that it "appears in practice that the jus ad bellum has
subtly influenced the jus in hello ever since the demise of the view of
the legal neutrality of the resort to force by states."' 164 This de facto ero-
sion observed by Professor Gardam under the Charter-system is a reflec-
tion of state practice and evolving customary international law that treat
military forces serving under the authority of the United Nations differ-
ently than military forces acting only under the authority of their respec-
tive states.
B. Jus in bello and the Law of Neutrality
The political notion of neutrality was first recognized in the four-
teenth century as a method for princes to declare their intent to abstain
from joining ongoing hostilities.165 Neutrality first acquired legal status
within the jus in bello after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia when it
evolved into a series of rights and duties imposed upon neutral and bel-
ligerent states.' 66 Although codification of these laws of neutrality first
began in 1899, they were not extensively addressed until the 1907 Hague
Peace Conference, which resulted in two conventions on the rights and
duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land and in case
of naval war. 67 These two conventions emphasized the impartiality to-
wards all belligerents."6
162. Id. at 392-94 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 412 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
164. Id.
165. See KorzscH, supra note 2, at 128.
166. See id. at 129.
167. See DocumENrs ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 61, 109.
168. Id. at 61.
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The League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, however,
raised questions concerning the legitimacy of neutrality in the face of an
unlawful use of force.' 9 During the Second World War, for example, a
number of neutral states took non-violent discriminatory measures against
states they regarded as unlawfully resorting to force. 70 While some states
urged that a new status of non-belligerency was emerging, these actions
were generally viewed as contrary to the laws of neutrality.' 7,
The contemporary law of neutrality is found in customary interna-
tional law.'7 It confers the right of inviolability upon neutral states, and
imposes on them an obligation to abstain from supporting the war efforts
of a belligerent state and to exercise their rights in an impartial manner
toward all belligerent states. 7 3 Conversely, a belligerent state has the
duty to respect a neutral state's right of inviolability, and the right to in-
sist that a neutral state fulfill its duties of abstention and impartiality. 74
The Charter's regime of collective security can impact a state's obli-
gations under the law of neutrality. 75 Article 2(5) requires all Member
States to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
... [and to] refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action."' 76 Moreover,
Article 25 requires all Member States to "accept and carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council . . . ."1 Similarly, Articles 48 and 49 re-
quire Member States to carry out the decisions of the Security Council
and to "join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures
decided upon by the Security Council."' 78 The internationally accepted
view is that the Charter modifies all Member States' obligations and re-
sponsibilities under the law of neutrality when the Security Council takes
action under Chapter VII of the Charter. 179 When the Security Council
does not act, then the laws of neutrality are unaffected by the Charter.'1°
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, 7.2.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. 7.2.1; DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 62.
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para 5. See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 30, at 62.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 25. See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
30, at 62.
178. U.N. CHARTER arts. 48, 49.
179. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, 7.2.1; DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 30, at 62.
180. See DOCUMENTs ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 62.
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The international community's acceptance of the Charter's authority
to modify the law of neutrality is a clear example of how the Charter's
regime of collective security and its norm of the jus contra bellum can
modify the jus in bello in the context of military operations under the au-
thority of the United Nations. Recent examples of the exercise of this au-
thority can be found in the Security Council resolutions relating to the
Persian Gulf War. Resolution 661, for example, prohibited all states from
trading with Iraq and authorized all states to assist the Government of
Kuwait.' Similarly, Resolution 678 requested all states to provide sup-
port for the enforcement action authorized by the Security Council
against Iraq. 82
C. Absolute Immunity for Military Forces Serving the United Nations
International law establishes a special status for the property and
personnel of military forces serving the United Nations. 8 3 Article 105 of
the Charter provides that the United Nations "shall enjoy in the territory
of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary
for the fulfilment of its purposes" and that its representatives "shall sim-
ilarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the inde-
pendent exercise of their functions. ... "s184 The Convention on the Priv-
ileges and Immunities of the United Nations 8 5 details the general
protections of Article 105' 6 by creating an undisputed regime of absolute
immunity for the property, funds, and assets of the United Nations.,"
This Convention makes it clear that this immunity applies to all property,
funds, and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held. 88 This im-
munity from receiving state interference is required to ensure the inde-
pendent exercise of the United Nations and its organs. 89 Accordingly, the
property, funds, and assets of military peace-keeping forces created under
the authority of the Security Council, as a subsidiary organ of the United
181. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
182. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
183. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see Sharp, supra note 9, at 127-38.
184. U.N. CHARTER art. 105.
185. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13,
1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, available in 1946 WL 673 [hereinafter Privileges
and Immunities Convention].
186. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 1138.
187. See id. at 1140. These provisions are considered customary international law
and have never been disputed. Id. at 1138-40.
188. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 185, arts. 2-4.
189. See U.N. CHARTER art. 105.
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Nations, 19 enjoy absolute immunity as provided by the Privileges and
Immunities Convention.
The model status of forces agreement (SOFA) used by the United
Nations and receiving states further extends the protections of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Convention to the military personnel of peace-
keeping forces serving the United Nations. 19' The provisions of the
United Nations model SOFA are considered customary international
law' 92 and thus apply to military forces serving the United Nations even
if the operation-specific SOFAs are not concluded. The terms of this
United Nations model SOFA, 93 and thus customary international law, are
limited to operations established under the authority of the United Na-
tions and conducted under United Nations authority and control. 94
Under this model SOFA, the privileges and immunities for personnel
within a military force serving the United Nations vary depending upon
their assigned position. Military observers receive "experts on mission"
status that accords them "such privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary for the independent exercise of their functions," makes them im-
mune from arrest or detention, and immunizes them from "legal process
190. See U.N. CHARTER art. 29 ("The Security Council may establish such subsidi-
ary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."); THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 485 ("It is widely held that the
peace-keeping forces established by the SC as subsidiary organs find their legal basis in
Art. 29, since they support the SC in its responsibilities under Art. 24(1) of maintaining
international peace.").
191. See Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations: Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Model SOFA for
U.N. operations: Report of the Secretary-General]. SOFAs address the rights, privileges,
powers, duties, and obligations of a foreign military force. See SERGE LAZAREFF, STATUS
OF MIHIARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 2, 3 (1971).
192. See Model SOFA for U.N. operations: Report of the Secretary-General, supra
note 191, i1 1; Letter from Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, the United Nations, to Robert B. Rosenstock, Minister Coun-
sellor, United States Mission to the United Nations (Apr. 25, 1995) (on file with author);
Model agreement between the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel
and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations, U.N. Doc. A/46/185 (May
23, 1991); Agreement between the United Nations and Canada regarding the provision of
Military personnel and equipment to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (Nov.
30, 1994) (on file with author).
193. Model SOFA for UJV. operations: Report of the Secretary-General, supra note
191, §§ 11-1ll.
194. This formula of application is parallel to the definition of United Nations oper-
ations in art. 1 of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Person-
nel, supra note 10, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995). For a detailed analysis and criti-
cism of the Safety Convention, see Sharp, supra note 9, at 143-63, 172-73.
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of every kind" during the course of their official duties' 95 As an ad hoc
arrangement, other personnel operating under a U.N. mandate are some-
times specified by the Secretary-General to be experts on mission. Amer-
ican aircrews who served as coercive peace-keepers and flew missions in
support of the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, for example, were regarded as experts on mission for
the United Nations.196
The Commander of the force receives the protections of a diplo-
matic envoy accorded the Secretary-General under international law. 97
Commanders are not subject to any form of arrest or detention and enjoy
complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. 198
They also enjoy immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction
of the receiving state except in the case of actions relating to: private im-
movable property situated within the receiving state; succession when the
envoy is either an executor, administrator, or heir;, or, any professional or
commercial activity outside the envoy's official functions.' 99
Members of the force receive the more limited privileges and immu-
nities as detailed in the United Nations model SOFA. They are immune
from criminal and civil jurisdiction for all acts performed in their official
capacity; exempt from all income taxes except on income received from
sources inside the receiving state; exempt from all other direct taxes, re-
gistration fees or charges; and, exempt from those laws and regulations
governing customs and foreign exchange for personal property required
by reason of their presence in the receiving state." °
Limited by its own terms, the privileges and immunities from re-
ceiving state sovereignty derived from the United Nations model SOFA
only devolve, however, to United Nations forces that are a subsidiary or-
gan of the United Nations because they are acting under the direction of
the Security Council (e.g., UNOSOM201 and UNOSOM H202).2 03 These
195. Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 185, art. 22.
196. See Letter from Ralph Zacklin, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs, the United Nations, to Robert B. Rosenstock, Minister Coun-
sellor, United States Mission to the United Nations (Mar. 4, 1994) (on file with author).
197. See Privileges and Immunities Convention, supra note 185, art. 19. These pro-
tections under international law are principally contained in the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
198. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 197, arts. 29, 31.
199. Id. art. 31.
200. See generally Model SOFA for U.N. operations: Report of the Secretary-
General, supra note 191.
201. The United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) initially consisted of
fifty consensual peace-keepers under the supervision of the Secretary-General authorized
to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, Somalia. It later evolved into a security force of
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privileges and immunities do not apply to those unilateral or multilateral
forces that are simply acting under the authority of the United Nations
(e.g., UNITAF'Z°).
Absolute immunity for all United Nations forces conducting peace
operations, both directed and authorized, can be derived, however, from
the coercive authority of the Security Council and its implied powers.
Member States have agreed "to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council." 2°5 The drafters of the Charter viewed this coercive de-
cision-making authority of the Security Council as indispensable for the
effective functioning of the United Nations in the field of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security, and considered this authority to be the
core element of the United Nations concept.3
Given the central importance of the Security Council's coercive au-
thority in the field of maintaining international peace and security, Arti-
cle 105 must be read to grant certain privileges and immunities to the Se-
curity Council and all of those military forces serving under its authority.
The Security Council must be granted those privileges and immunities
that are necessary for it to fulfill its Chapter VII responsibilities; simi-
larly, the personnel of a United Nations force must be given those privi-
leges and immunities necessary to independently exercise their functions.
To interpret Article 105 differently or infer otherwise would vitiate the
Security Council's coercive authority and make it unable to act without
approximately 500 Pakistani military personnel. See S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
202. The Expanded United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM HI) was au-
thorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter to consolidate, expand,
and maintain the secure environment throughout Somalia established by UNITAF. See
S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/814 (1993).
203. See U.N. CHAPTER art. 29 ("The Security Council may establish such subsidi-
ary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."); THE CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: A COmmINTARY, supra note 3, at 485 ("It is widely held that the
peace-keeping forces established by the SC as subsidiary organs find their legal basis in
Art. 29, since they support the SC in its responsibilities under Art. 24(1) of maintaining
international peace.").
204. When UNOSOM failed to adequately establish security for international relief
agencies, the Security Council authorized the Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) as a
chapter VII operation in Somalia under the command and control of the United States.
UNITAF was authorized "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." S.C. Res. 794, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
205. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
206. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
408-09.
(Vol. 22
REVOKING AN AGGRESSOR'S LICENSE TO KILL
the consent of the receiving state. 2°7Article 105 is universally imple-
mented by the Privileges and Immunities Convention and customary in-
ternational law to grant absolute immunity for the property, funds, and
assets of the United Nations to ensure the United Nations can act inde-
pendently when present in a receiving state with its full consent and co-
operation. It is even more compelling, therefore, that a United Nations
force present in a receiving state without a receiving state's consent must
have absolute immunity. This form of absolute immunity for a United
Nations force is limited, however, to the extent necessary for the inde-
pendent exercise of its mandate and only with respect to those receiving
states against which the Security Council has taken coercive action.
Military forces serving the United Nations are granted privileges and
immunities beyond what the military forces of a state are granted when
they act solely pursuant to state authority. The absolute immunity for the
property, funds, and assets of military forces serving under the direction
of the United Nations is undisputed, and the privileges and immunities of
the personnel of these military forces now reflect customary international
law. Coercive peace-keepers also have absolute immunity to the extent
necessary for the independent exercise of its mandate.
This regime of privileges and immunities, which treats military
forces serving the United Nations different than those deployed under
state authority, is an example of how the Charter has modified the jus in
bello. Previously, the deployment of a military force in the territory of a
state without that state's consent could be considered an act that consti-
tutes de facto hostilities and invokes the application of the jus in bello.208
When serving under the authority of the Charter, however, a coercive
peace-keeping force deployed in the territory of a state without that
state's consent may exert absolute immunity vis-a-vis the receiving state
to the extent necessary for the independent exercise of its mandate.
D. The Concept of "Peaceful Purposes"
The most essential purpose of the United Nations is to maintain in-
ternational peace and security through effective collective measures. 209
207. See Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advi-
sory Opinion), 1949 I.CJ. 174 (Apr. 11) (holding that under "international law, the Or-
ganization [United Nations] must be deemed to have those powers which, though not ex-
pressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of its duties."), excerpts reprinted in CASES ON UNITED NA-
TIONS LAw 33, 39 (Louis B. Soln ed., 2d ed. 1967).
208. See discussion supra Part H.B.
209. See THE CHARTER OF THE UrnoD NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
50-51.
1998]
40 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
The decisions of the organs of the United Nations210 implement this es-
sential purpose, and are "evidence of the application and interpretation in
practice of the Purposes of the Charter." 21' Specifically, the Security
Council is required to act in accordance with the purposes of the United
Nations in the discharge of its responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.212 It is undisputed that if an act of an organ
of the United Nations is unnecessary to accomplish the purposes of the
United Nations, or is inconsistent with such purposes, the act is ultra
vires and void under international and domestic law. 213 Consequently, all
acts of the Security Council must be for peaceful purposes, or they are
void ab initio. Since it is internationally accepted that the Security Coun-
cil has the coercive authority to deploy an armed force in the territory of
a state without that state's consent in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security, 214 it follows that all military actions authorized
by the Security Council must be for peaceful purposes.
This syllogism is supported by state practice. The International Mar-
itime Satellite Organization 2 5 [hereinafter Inmarsat], for example, is re-
quired to "act exclusively for peaceful purposes. ' 216 Inmarsat was estab-
lished "to make provision for the space segment necessary for improving
maritime communications, thereby assisting in improving distress and
safety of life at sea communications, efficiency and management of
210. There are six principal organs of the United Nations: (1) General Assembly, (2)
Security Council, (3) Economic and Social Council, (4) Trusteeship Council, (5) Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and (6) Secretariat. U.N. CHARTR art. 7.
211. THE CHARTER OF THE UNrTED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 50.
212. See U.N. CHARTER art. 24. The Article provides in relevant part:
(1) In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
(2) In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers
granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down
in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
Id.
213. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNrrmED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 3, at
29, 1129. In its 1962 Certain Expenses opinion, the International Court of Justice estab-
fished a rebuttable presumption that acts of the United Nations are intra vires. Id. at
1129.
214. THE CHARTER OF THE UNrED NATIONS: A CoMEmNTARY, supra note 3, at 590-
91, 608-16.
215. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, Sept. 3, 1976,
31 U.S.T. 1, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Inmarsat Convention].
216. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
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ships, maritime public correspondence services and radiodetermination
capabilities. '21 7 The space segment owned or leased by Inmarsat is open
for use by ships of all nations without discrimination based on national-
ity.2' 8 The term "peaceful purposes" is not further defined in the Inmar-
sat Convention. 219
As a result of the increasing interest by parties to the Inmarsat Con-
vention to use the Inmarsat system for their military forces, the Inmarsat
legal directorate reviewed the Inmarsat Convention's requirement that In-
marsat act exclusively for peaceful purposes.M Dr. Wolf D. Von Noor-
den, Special Counsel to Inmarsat, undertook a comprehensive legal anal-
ysis of the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in light of an increasingly
active use of military forces by the Security Council. 22' Dr. Von Noorden
reviewed the extensive use of the Inmarsat system during the Persian
Gulf War and the Falklands conflict, as well as United Nations opera-
tions such as Somalia and Bosnia, and concluded that military forces
serving the United Nations are subject to a different legal regime than
military forces acting under state authority alone.2m2
Dr. Von Noorden begins his analysis of the Inmarsat Convention's
peaceful purposes requirement in the context of other international agree-
ments, such as the Outer Space Treaty from which the Inmarsat language
was taken. 223 The Preamble of the Outer Space Treaty recognized the
"common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes." 4 Specific provisions applica-
217. Id. art. 3, para. 1. The term "space segment" is defined as "the satellites, and
the tracking, telemetry, command, control, monitoring and related facilities and equipment
required to support the operation of these satellites." Id. art. 1, para. d.
218. Id. art. 1, para. E, art. 7, para. 1.
219. See generally id.
220. See Memorandum from Alan Auckenthaler, General Counsel, Inmarsat, to all
Inmarsat Signatories and Routing Organisations, (Nov. 8, 1994) (on file with author).
221. See Memorandum of law on The "Peaceful Purposes" Requirement and Inmar-
sat use by Armed Forces, Dr. Wolf D. Von Noorden, Special Counsel, Inmarsat, to Alan
Auckenthaler, General Counsel, Inmarsat 1 (June 29, 1994) (on file with author) [herein-
after Inmarsat Memorandum of Law].
222. See id. at 16.
223. Id. at 4.
224. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
pmbl., 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter the Outer Space Treaty]. In an ef-
fort to contribute to international peace and cooperation, this treaty prohibits any national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty and declares that outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is free for the exploration and use by all States without dis-
crimination of any kind. Id. pmbl., arts. 1, 11. State Parties are required to "carry on activ-
ities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
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ble to military activities in outer space are found in Article W, which
provides that
States Parties to the treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifica-
tions, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of mili-
tary maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or fa-
cility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.225
These restrictions do not, however, preclude the employment of space-
based systems "to perform essential command, control, communications,
intelligence, navigation, environmental, surveillance and warning func-
tions to assist military activities on land, in the air, and on and under the
sea." 6 The United States has consistently interpreted peaceful purposes
to mean nonaggressive purposes. 227 This interpretation recognizes that a
state's inherent right of self-defense extends to outer space and allows
any military activity not otherwise inconsistent with the Charter.M
After this contextual analysis, Dr. Von Noorden analyzes the Inmar-
sat Convention's requirement that its activities must be consistent with
bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations,
in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international
co-operation and understanding." Id. art. ll.
225. Id. art. IV. This article embraces three, very narrowly drafted restrictions. First,
States Parties are prohibited from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the
Earth, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing them in outer space in
any manner, regardless of their intended purpose. Second, States Parties are prohibited
from establishing military bases, testing any type of weapons, and conducting military
maneuvers on celestial bodies-regardless of their intended purpose. Finally, all other ac-
tivities of State Parties on the moon and other celestial bodies must be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes.
226. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, 2.9.2.
227. See OFFCE OF THE JUDGE ADvOcATE GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF mm NAVY. NWP
9 (REV. A), ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS 2-48 n.99 (1989) [hereinafter CoMMANDER's HANDBOOK (SUPP.)].
228. Id.
[Vol. 22
REVOKING AN AGGRESSOR'S LICENSE TO KILL
the purposes of the Charter.229 After concluding that United Nations en-
forcement measures to prevent or suppress aggression are done for peace-
ful purposes within the meaning of the Charter,230 he proposes the
following
GUIDELINES FOR INMARSAT USE BY ARMED FoRcEs:
(i) Use of Inmarsat by armed forces (military use) not involved
in armed conflict and any threat to or breach of the peace is con-
sistent with [the Inmarsat] Convention, Article 3(3).
(ii) Use of Inmarsat by UN peacekeeping or peacemaking forces
acting under the auspices of the UN in implementation of UN
Security Council decisions in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security is consistent with [the Inmarsat] Con-
vention, Article 3(3), irrespective of such UN forces becoming in-
volved in armed conflict in the accomplishment of their UN
mission; involvement in armed conflict is a possibility implicit in
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security
by UN forces.
(iii) Use of Inmarsat by armed forces - other than UN forces act-
ing under the auspices of the UN Security Council - involved in
international or non-international armed conflict is, in principle,
not permitted under [the Inmarsat] Convention, Article 3(3),
without prejudice to the exceptional case of legitimate individual
or collective self-defense against armed attack and within the
limitations established by UN Charter, Article 51. The latter pro-
hibit preventive action and self-help involving armed force in the
absence of armed attack.
(iv) Use of Inmarsat by armed forces engaged in armed conflict
is permitted for D&S [distress & safety] communications, and for
communications relating to the protection of the wounded, sick,
shipwrecked, prisoners of war and civilians, pursuant to the Ge-
neva Red Cross Conventions, 1949, and the Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions, 1977. The same applies to personal
and private, non-tactical communications by members of the
armed forces that are not related to or in support of the war
effort.23l
229. See Inmarsat Memorandum of Law, supra note 221, at 5.
230. Id. at 6-7.
231. Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
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The basis for these GUIDELN S is the recognition that military forces in-
volved in international armed conflict under the authority of the Security
Council are engaged in activities consistent with the "peaceful purposes"
requirements of the Charter. The emphasized portions of these GuIDE-
LINES reinforce with perfect clarity that Inmarsat treats military forces
serving the United Nations as separate legal entities that have greater
rights under international law, even when they are belligerents engaged
in armed conflict, than military forces serving solely pursuant to state au-
thority. A logical extension of this recognition that belligerent military
forces serving the United Nations are engaged in peaceful activities, is
that they deserve a greater protected status under international law than
belligerents who serve solely pursuant to state authority.
E. Previous Challenges to the Doctrine
There have been a number of challenges to the application of the
doctrine of equal application to military forces serving the United Na-
tions ever since the Charter outlawed the aggressive use of force.23
2
Some have even concluded that the jus in bello do not automatically ap-
ply to collective measures of the United Nations.233 Others have often
said that United Nations peace-keeping forces "are soldiers without ene-
mies and therefore fundamentally different from belligerent forces."4 A
number of institutions and scholars continue to raise this issue, and many
suggest that United Nations forces should have a special code and should
not be governed in all respects by the same law of international armed
conflict as national armies.235 Perhaps, the most notable of these chal-
lenges was that of Sir Hartley Shawcross before the Nuremberg IMT re-
flected in the epigraph to this Article. As the senior British prosecutor at
Nuremberg,2 Shawcross argued in his closing argument that the killing
of combatants in war is justifiable only where the war is legal. 237 While
these challenges have been unsuccessful to date, they failed for reasons
that either no longer apply or do not apply to the creation of a special
protected status for belligerent military forces serving the United Nations.
Professor Gardam, for example, discusses four reasons why these chal-
232. See Gardam, supra note 101, at 410-11; NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW, supra note
3, at 371-75; BROWNuE. supra note 3, at 406.
233. See BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 400.
234. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COmMENTARY, supra note 3, at
600.
235. See SEYERSTED, supra note 87, at 179.
236. See Hartley Shawcross, Let the Tribunal Do Its Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
1996, at A17.
237. See KOTZSCH. supra note 2, at 122 n.148.
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lenges have not succeeded in the past.23 8
First, Professor Gardam explains that any argument concerning the
unequal application of the jus in bello "assumes an effective method of
determining the lawfulness of the aggression." 239 She then notes, how-
ever, that this determination can properly be made by the United Nations,
and provides a recent example of the Security Council fulfilling this role
by condemning the unlawful use of force by Iraq against Kuwait.m Sec-
ond, she concludes that the contemporary basis for the equal application
of the jus in bello are their humanitarian nature, noting that all soldiers
and civilians should be entitled to the benefit of the rules even if a state
is engaged in the unlawful use of force.241 The real merit of her second
reason to continue to support the doctrine is to counter the suggestion by
some that without the doctrine of equal application, none of the jus in
bello would apply to military forces serving the United Nations, or that
the United Nations could choose those rules that would apply to its mili-
tary forces.242 In contrast, the revocation of the aggressor's license to kill
proposed by this Article only creates a protected status for military forces
serving the United Nations. Under this proposal all of the humanitarian
rules of the jus in bello would remain in force.243
Third, Professor Gardam notes that the Nuremberg IMT embraced
the doctrine of equal application. 244 The Charter of the IMT, however,
was limited to the application of international law as it existed at the
time of its creation on August 8, 1945,245 and the Charter did not enter
into force until two months later on October 24, 1945.24 Thus, the IMT
was not authorized to consider the impact of the coercive authority of the
Security Council and the unique role of military forces authorized by the
international community to use force to maintain or restore international
peace and security. 4 7 However, when specifically considering this issue
in the 1948 General Devastation Case, the judges of the IMT did ex-
press their view that they had "to accept that imperfect state as existing
238. See Gardam, supra note 101, at 410-12.
239. Id. at 410.
240. See id. at 410-11.
241. See id. at 411.
242. See id. 410 n.103.
243. See discussion infra Part V.C.
244. See Gardam, supra note 101, at 411.
245. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Char-
ter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), 1st Sess., pt. 2, (Dec. 11, 1946) [herein-
after Affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CON-
FuCTS, supra note 4, at 921.
246. THE CHARTER OF THE UNrIED NATIONS: A CoMMENTARY, supra note 3, at 12.
247. See id. at 632-35 (discussing permissible Security Council measures).
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law."2' Finally, Professor Gardam notes that the practice of states during
the Persian Gulf War "supports the theoretical independence of the jus in
bello from the jus ad bellum." 249 Although she regrets the direction of
evolving state practice, Professor Gardam concludes that the recent Per-
sian Gulf War demonstrates that an analysis which equally applies the jus
in bello to all parties engaged in hostilities is too simplistic and that "in
reality, the jus ad bellum to some extent may determine the jus in
bello."m
F. Contemporary State Practice: Military Operations
Several international conventions explicitly recognize the special
protected status of military forces conducting operations under the au-
thority of the United Nations. The Certain Conventional Weapons Con-
vention accords special consideration for United Nations forces from the
effects of minefields, mines and booby-traps:
1. When a United Nations force or mission performs functions of
peacekeeping, observation or similar functions in any area, each
party to the conflict shall, if requested by the head of the United
Nations force or mission in that area, as far as it is able:
(a) remove or render harmless all mines or booby traps
in that area;
(b) take such measures as may be necessary to protect
the force or mission from the effects of minefields, mines
and booby traps while carrying out its duties; and
(c) make available to the head of the United Nations
force or mission in that area, all information in the party's
possession concerning the location of minefields, mines and
booby traps in that area.211
Article 38 of Protocol I makes the distinctive emblem of the United
Nations an internationally protected emblem.252 Article 37 specifically
248. Ko zscH, supra note 2, at 122 n.147.
249. Gardam, supra note 101, at 411.
250. Id. at 393-94.
251. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, Protocol II art. 8, Apr. 10, 1981, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Certain Conventional
Weapons Convention], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at
479, 483-84.
252. Protocol I, supra note 114, art. 38, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 389.
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recognizes the protected status of United Nations forces and other mili-
tary forces serving under the authority of the United Nations that are not
a party to an armed conflict. Paragraph l(d) of Article 37 makes "the
feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of
the United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the con-
flict" an unlawful act of perfidy.253
The report of the Protocol I drafting committee for Articles 37 and
38, however, limited the protected status of the United Nations to those
situations where the United Nations forces are not belligerents engaged
in an enforcement action involving armed combat.254 During these situa-
tions when United Nations forces are belligerents, the view of the draft-
ers in the late-1970s was that existing international law governing the use
of United Nations signs, emblems, and uniforms places the United Na-
tions on equal footing with any other belligerent party to the conflict.
255
State practice and specific resolutions of the Security Council since the
drafting of Protocol I and the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention,
however, specifically reject the rote application of the Common Article 2
threshold to military operations under the authority of the United
Nations.
1. Military Operations in Somalia
In December of 1992, the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII
authority to authorize a coercive peace-keeping force to use all necessary
means to establish a secure environment in Somalia for humanitarian re-
lief operations. 256 Even though military forces were deployed under the
authority of the United Nations without the consent of the parties to the
ongoing internal armed conflict in Somalia, the Security Council de-
manded "that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all
measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other
253. Protocol I, supra note 114, art. 37, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 389. Unlawful acts of perfidy are defined in paragraph 1 of Arti-
cle 37 as those acts "inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that
he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Id.
254. See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 1949, at 206-11 (1982).
255. See id. at 206.
256. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992). For an
excellent operational history and political reflection on the international community's pol-
icy in Somalia, see JOHN L. HIRscH & ROBERT B. OAKLEY, SOMALIA AND OPERATION RE-
STORE HOPE-REFLEcONS ON PEA EMAKING AND PEACEKEEPING (1995).
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personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including
the military forces ... ." and affirmed that individuals will be held ac-
countable for all violations of international humanitarian law.257 As the
United Nations operations in Somalia later expanded, the Security Coun-
cil once again demanded that "all Somali parties, including movements
and factions, take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel of
the United Nations and its agencies as well as the staff of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, intergovernmental organizations and
non-governmental organizations ....,"258
On June 5, 1993, a series of armed attacks against United Nations
military personnel left 24 dead and 57 injured.259 In response, the Secur-
ity Council reaffirmed the Secretary-General's authority "to take all mea-
sures necessary against all those responsible for the armed attacks ...
[and] to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and de-
tention for prosecution, trial and punishment."w Attacks on United Na-
tions military forces continued as the United Nations increased its mili-
tary operations for the capture of the warlord believed responsible for the
attacks on 5 June.261 The intensity of the hostilities peaked on October 3,
1993, when nineteen peace-keepers were killed and another ninety were
wounded.262
In response to the report of the Commission of Inquiry established
to investigate these armed attacks263 and the subsequent Secretary-
General's report,2x6 the Security Council passed Resolution 868. The Res-
olution declared these attacks unlawful:
The Security Council,...
Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
concerning privileges and immunities and the Convention on the
257. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992).
258. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993).
259. See Report of the Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 885
(1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel, 117, U.N. Doc. S/1994/
653 (June 1, 1994) [hereinafter Report of the Commission], reprinted in THE UNrrED NA-
T1ONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 77, at 368, 376.
260. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993).
261. See Report of the Commission, supra note 259, If[ 125-173, reprinted in THE
UNrED NATIONS Am SOMALIA, supra note 77, at 368, 377-80.
262. See Report of the Commission, supra note 259, 1173, reprinted in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 77, at 368, 380.
263. See generally Report of the Commission, supra note 259, reprinted in THE
UNrIED NATIONS AND SOMALIA, supra note 77, at 368, 380.
264. Security of United Nations Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. S/26358, Aug. 27, 1993.
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Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, as applicable to
United Nations operations and persons engaged in such
operations,
Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of attacks and
use of force against person engaged in United Nations operations,
and resolutely condemning all such actions ....
3. Urges States and parties to a conflict to cooperate closely with
the United Nations to ensure the security and safety of United
Nations forces and personnel;
4. Confirms that attacks and the use of force against persons en-
gaged in a United Nations operation authorized by the Security
Council will be considered interference with the exercise of the
responsibilities of the Council and may require the Council to
consider measures it deems appropriate;
5. Confirms also that if, in the view of the Council, the host
country is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations with regard
to the safety and security of a United Nations operation and per-
sonnel engaged in the operation, the Council will consider what
steps should be taken appropriate to the situation; .... M
After a full investigation of the facts and a report on the use of force
used to arrest those believed responsible for the attacks on United Na-
tions personnel, this Resolution explicitly declares that the coercive
peace-keepers serving under the authority of the United Nations in
Somalia are protected persons immune from attack despite their use of
armed force. This declaration is consistent with the view of the United
States that it was not a party to an armed conflict during its military op-
erations in Somalia.2'6
2. Military Operations in the Former Yugoslavia
The dissolution of the federal state of the former Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s resulted in an international armed conflict27 that shocked the
265. S.C. Res. 868, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/868 (1993).
266. S. Exec. Res. 75, 105th Cong., CONG. REc. S3373, S3378 (daily ed. Apr. 17,
1997); President's Certifications and Report to the Congress in Connection with the U.S.
Senate Resolution of Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Apr. 25, 1997),
available in White House Virtual Library <http://library.whitehouse.gov>.
267. See M. CHERI BASSIOUNI & PETER MANiKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRnMiNAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGOsLAVIA 1 (1996). The former Yugoslavia con-
sisted of six republics: Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Macedonia. Id. at 1 n.1.
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international community by the level of its barbaric cruelty.m The princi-
pal response of the international community was organized under the au-
thority of the United Nations. In 1993, for example, the Security Council
used its coercive authority to create the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia for the "sole purpose of prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law com-
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia" since 1991.269 After
more than three years of diplomatic efforts by the international commu-
nity and the United States-led Balkan peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, from
November 1-21, 1995, the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croa-
tia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 14,
1995.270 The eleven annexes of this Agreement made provisions for. the
military aspects of a peace settlement, regional stabilization, an inter-
entity boundary line, democratic elections, a new constitution for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, binding arbitration of disputes, respect for human
rights, arrangements for refugees and displaced persons, the preservation
of national monuments, infrastructure and economic reconstruction, and
the creation of an international police task force assistance program.2'1
Pursuant to its coercive authority, the Security Council authorized
Member States to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR)
to use all necessary means to ensure compliance with the provisions of
the military annex to the peace agreement.272 The Security Council ex-
plicitly authorized Member States "to take all necessary measures. .. ei-
ther in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission
* . .[and recognized] the right of the force to take all necessary measures
268. See, e.g., Peter Cary, War casualties: Bosnia by the numbers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1995, at 53; Robin Knight et al., The hunt for the killers of Bosnia,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1995, at 52; Rod Nordland, 'Let's Kill the Muslims!',
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1993, at 48; Patricia Forestier, Psychiatric Genocide! How the Bar-
barities of 'Ethnic Cleansing' Were Spawned by Psychiatry, FREEDOM, May 1993, at 6, 9.
269. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). For an
excellent review of all aspects of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia, see generally BASSIouNI & MANIKAS, supra note 267; VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MIcHAEl P. ScHiAF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAMTIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FoRMER YuosLAv k A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1995).
270. See Peace Agreements bring a 'long-delayed birth of hope': Multinational
Force set up in Bosnia to replace UNPROFOR, UN CHRoNICLE, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1,
Spring 1996, at 25.
271. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Dec. 14, 1995) [hereinafter Dayton Peace Agreement].
272. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031, pmbl., 9N 15-
16 (1995).
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to defend itself from attack or threat of attack. '' 2 3 Notwithstanding this
explicit authority to use force to establish a lasting cessation of hostili-
ties, Security Council Resolution 1031 also demanded that all "parties
respect the security and freedom of movement of IFOR and other inter-
national personnel. ' 274 The parties to the conflict also specifically agreed
to grant "experts on mission" status to IFOR personnel under the provi-
sions of the Privileges and Immunities Convention.2 5 This resolution is
an explicit rejection of the rote application of the Common Article 2
threshold for military forces serving the United Nations. It clearly incor-
porates a new rule of law that recognizes United Nations forces are a
separate category of protected persons even when authorized to use force
to maintain international peace and security.
3. Military Maritime Operations
The international community has also recognized a de facto pro-
tected status for military maritime forces serving under the authority of
the United Nations.276 In 1996, eighteen countries met in Chile "to estab-
lish a legal order or doctrine which would determine and govern with
greater clarity Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the possible operations,
obligations and rights of the countries and of naval forces in time of war
or armed conflict on the sea."' 277 The representative from the United
States, Captain Bruce B. Davidson focused his presentation on the impact
of Chapter VII authority on peacetime maritime operations.278 He con-
cluded that the status of naval forces enforcing Chapter VII resolutions is
inconsistent with the pre-Charter status accorded neutrals and belliger-
ents, and that the Charter has modified the application of the jus in bello
to military forces serving under the authority of the United Nations:
273. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031, 117 (1995).
274. S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1031, 118 (1995).
275. Dayton Peace Agreement, supra note 271, App. B to Annex 1-A, para. 2. See
discussion supra Part III.C for a detailed description of the protections accorded experts
on mission.
276. This section of the Article is, in part, a summary of a more detailed analysis of
this issue that can be found in Sharp, supra note 9, at 170-72.
277. Hernan Cisternas, Belligerents or Neutrals: The Status of U.N. Naval Forces is
Analyzed, EL MERCURIO (Santiago, Chile), June 28, 1996 (rough translation) (on file with
author).
278. Captain Bruce B. Davidson, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Sta-
tus and Rights of Warships in a Multinational Force Tasked to Enforce Security Council
Resolutions in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Remarks at
the Symposium on Maritime International Law, Valparaiso, Chile (June 25, 1996) (tran-
script on file with author).
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While the law of neutrality defines who is a belligerent and who
is a non-belligerent, Chapter VII has modified the law of neutral-
ity to permit forces carrying out Chapter VII mandates to do cer-
tain things without becoming belligerents. Forces in these circum-
stances should not be viewed as 'parties to the conflict'.... I do
not believe that, at this point, we can conclude that multinational
naval forces, because they are implementing a Chapter VII man-
date, could never be viewed as belligerents; that is, that they
could not legally be the object of attack by a party to the con-
flict.... Determination of their status thus will rely on an objec-
tive, factual assessment.... Of course, the exact point of transi-
tion between not being a party to the conflict and belligerency
will be very difficult to determine. However, there is a variety of
actions that should not be viewed as crossing the line - which
would make these forces lawful targets. 279
Captain Davidson then listed six examples of maritime-related activities
that do not cross the line: presence and deterrence operations for the
purpose of showing resolve and deterring aggression; peace operations
that involve interpositional forces or the monitoring of a cease fire agree-
ment; humanitarian operations that potentially involve the use of force
for noncombatant evacuation operations; escorting flag vessels of non-
belligerents which may require the use of force in either individual or
collective self-defense; maritime interception operations that are struc-
tured to be as non-intrusive as possible, but authorize warning shots and
disabling fire; and the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense which
imposes on a military commander the obligation to use all necessary
means available to defend his or her unit.2m
Since a number of these operations, such as the maritime intercept
operations, have been traditionally viewed in customary practice as either
a belligerent act of blockade or visit and search,2 1 this view clearly es-
tablishes a separate regime of international law applicable to military
forces serving the United Nations. While the Australian representative to
this symposium did not address the non-belligerent or belligerent status
of military maritime forces serving the United Nations, Commander
Robin Warner, the Deputy Director of the Naval Legal Services for the
Royal Austrian Navy, did analyze how coercive measures authorized by
the Security Council may be inconsistent with existing rights and obliga-
279. Id. at 8-9, 11-12 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at 12-13.
281. See, e.g., COmmANER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, 1 7.6-7.7.5.
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tions of states under international law.2 2 One example of such an incon-
sistency is the ability of the Security Council to authorize Member States
to conduct a blockade at sea by laying sea mines in a coastal state's in-
ternal waters without that state's consent. Under the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, the coastal state has the right to refuse entry into its internal
waters.n3 Commander Warner concluded that the Chapter VII authority
of the Security Council can modify the international norms reflected in
the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention on maritime zones
and navigation regimes.285
G. Summary
International conventions, such as Protocol I and the Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Convention, explicitly recognize the special protected
status of non-belligerent military forces conducting operations under the
authority of the United Nations. State practice has clearly established that
this protected status includes coercive peace-keepers serving the United
Nations, even though they are authorized to use armed force in self-
defense and to accomplish a limited mission. In the context of these co-
ercive peace-keepers, the international community has rejected the rote
application of the Common Article 2 threshold for military forces serving
the United Nations in a number of situations, and has significantly raised
the threshold of its application. A maritime intercept operation that ten
years ago would have crossed the line of belligerency, for example, now
remains a peacetime military operation if it is conducted under the Chap-
ter VII authority of the Security Council. While state practice has not yet
extended a special status to belligerent military forces serving under the
authority of the United Nations, it is only a matter of time before this
evolution of customary international law reaches its logical and reasona-
ble conclusion.
The proposition of revoking an aggressor's license to kill military
forces serving the United Nations will carve out an exception to the doc-
trine of equal application that would establish all military forces serving
the United Nations, non-belligerents and belligerents, as protected per-
282. Commander Robin Warner, Royal Australian Navy, The Compatibility of 1982
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Norms with the Execution of Force Measures
that Might be Adopted by the Security Council in Accordance with Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, Remarks at the Symposium on Maritime International Law, Val-
paraiso, Chile (June 25, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
283. Id. at 5. See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter 1982 LOS Convention],
reprinted in UtffD NATIONS, THE LAw OF THE SEA 1 (1983).
284. Warner, supra note 282, at 5, 15-16.
1998]
54 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
sons and unlawful targets. Part III of this Article supported this proposi-
tion with case studies that reveal a de facto decline in the doctrine of
equal application in the treatment of military forces serving the United
Nations. Even in the context of belligerent military forces serving the
United Nations during the Persian Gulf War, Professor Gardam notes the
evolving relationship between jus ad bellum and jus in bello caused by
the Charter's prohibition on the aggressive use of force. In addition to of-
fering greater protection for military forces who serve the United Na-
tions, this proposition will also strengthen deterrence against aggressive
war.
IV. EFFEucrvE DETERRENCE AND WAR AVOIDANCE
A. Elements of Deterrence
Effective deterrence must be considered "in its broadest sense both
negative and positive, and including military and non-military incen-
tives." 285 More precisely, Professor John Norton Moore, the Walter L.
Brown Professor of Law and Director of the Center for National Security
Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, defines system-wide
deterrence as:
the totality of positive and negative actions influencing expecta-
tions and incentives of a potential aggressor, including: potential
military responses and security arrangements, relative power,
level and importance of economic relations, effectiveness of dip-
lomatic relations, effective international organizations (or lack
285. John Norton Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced Effectiveness in
United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. Ir'L L.
811, 841 (1997). This definition and the concept of deterrence was also explored in depth
in a seminar on "War & Peace: New Thinking About the Causes of War and War Avoid-
ance" offered by Professor John Norton Moore and Professor Robert F. Turner at the
University of Virginia School of Law during the 1997 Spring semester. According to the
overview of the syllabus to this seminar, the seminar
explores the latest research about controlling war, particularly the important
emerging consensus on the 'democratic peace' and the parallel and chilling new
information on the staggering human toll wrought by totalitarian 'democide,'
economic, and environmental failures. This seminar also seeks to explore a new
paradigm in war avoidance developed by Professor Moore... based on the im-
portance of democracy, deterrence, governmental structures, government failure,
and the rule of law.
John N. Moore and Robert F. Turner, Overview to Syllabus and Assignments-War &
Peace: New Thinking About the Causes of War and War Avoidance (Spring 1997) (on
file with author).
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thereof), effective international law (or lack thereof), alliances,
collective security, effects on allies, and the state of the political
or military alliance structure, if any, of the potential aggressor
and target state, etc.286
The most important single feature of effective deterrence with respect to
war avoidance is the military component.287 The four classic elements of
military deterrence are the ability to respond, the will to respond, the
communication of the ability and will to respond, and a potential adver-
sary's perception of the ability and will to respond.288 Figure 3 illustrates
these elements of military deterrence, casting them in terms of the mili-
tary capability and political commitment to respond with armed force, the
communication of this capability and commitment, and the perception of
capability and commitment.
THE ELEMENTS OF MILITARY DETERRENCE
(Figure 3: © 1997 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.)
286. Moore, supra note 285, at 841.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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In military deterrence theory, the United States Department of De-
fense focuses on the negative incentives by defining deterrence as "[tihe
prevention from action by fear of the consequences ... [and] a state of
mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable
counteraction." 219 It defines its deterrent options in both a negative and
positive context as "[a] course of action, developed on the best eco-
nomic, diplomatic, political, and military judgment, designed to dissuade
an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated opera-
tions. ' ' 290 Given the central importance of the rule of law as evidenced
by the far-reaching impact of the Charter's prohibition on the aggressive
use of force, general deterrence must be defined in the context of legal
deterrent options that dissuade an adversary from an undesirable course
of action. The three fundamental elements of legal deterrence are a set of
clear proscriptive norms, an established court system that ensures individ-
ual and state accountability for violations of those norms, and the inter-
national community's demonstrated commitment to condemn all viola-
tions of these proscriptive norms consistently and unequivocally.291 To be
effective, the normative component of any legal deterrent option must be
enforced.292
B. The Moore Paradigm of War Avoidance
Although the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello address the rules
governing the resort to war and the conduct of war, they do not address
the cause or causes of war. Some of the most popular theories that at-
tempt to explain the causes of war include: specific disputes among na-
tions; absence of dispute settlement mechanisms; ideological disputes;
ethnic and religious differences; communication failures; proliferation of
weapons and arms races; social and economic injustice; imbalance of
power; balance of power; competition for resources or other values; inci-
dents, accidents, and miscalculations; violence in the nature of man; ag-
gressive national leaders; and economic determinism.293 While all of
these theories contribute to our understanding of the causes of war to va-
rying degrees, none of them powerfully correlates with the occurrence or
289. JOINT PUB 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND Asso-
CIATED TERm 115 (1994).
290. Id.
291. See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage
During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MI.. L. RE V. 1, 4-
5 (1992).
292. See Robert F. Turner, Don't Let Saddam Escape Without Trial, ATLANTA JJAT-
LATA CONST., Aug. 31, 1991, at B2.
293. See Moore, supra note 285, at 819.
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non-occurrence of war.2
After twenty-five years of comparative, historical analysis of the
causes of war, Professor Donald Kagan, Yale Professor of History, Clas-
sics, and Western Civilization, determined that an interstate competition
for power, either for a state's own selfish gain or for security, creates the
environment for war to develop.295 In his detailed case studies of the Pel-
oponnesian War, the First World War, the Second Punic War, and the
Second World War, Professor Kagan concludes that war was caused dur-
ing this competition for power by a failure of states to take appropriate
actions to preserve the peace, i.e., war is caused by a failure in deter-
rence.296 Accordingly, he postulates that "[pleace does not keep itself," 297
and concludes that peace is best maintained when those states with the
preponderant power have the desire to preserve the peace.298 The Pelo-
ponnesian War began, for example, when the Athenians were unable to
match their policies and threats with a commensurate military ability to
respond.299 Similarly, it was the commitment to appeasement in the face
of Germany's aggression and the failure of the Western allies to demon-
strate effective military deterrence and their resolve for collective security
that led to the Second World War.3°
Professor Rudy J. Rummel, Professor of Political Science Emeritus
at the University of Hawaii, has studied the causes of war for forty
years °" In one of the most remarkable series of studies of this-century,
Professor Rummel has empirically proven "the most important fact of
our time . . . that democracy is a method of nonviolence. '"M Professor
Rummel supports this fact with three levels of analysis. The first-level
explanation is the democratic peace theory of Immanuel Kant, which as-
serts that the public will within representative governments restrains deci-
sion-makers from international violence. 30 3 The simple reason for this is
294. Id. at 820.
295. See KAGAN. supra note 13, at xiii, 6-7.
296. See, e.g., id. at 74.
297. Id. at 73, 212, 567.
298. See id. at 570.
299. See id. at 74.
300. See id. at 413-17.
301. RUDY J. RUMMEL, POWER KILLS: DEMOCRACY AS A METHOD OF NONVIOLENCE,
ix (1997).
302. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
303. See id. at 129-35. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was
[a] German philosopher, considered by many the most influential thinker of
modem times.... Kant's ethical ideas are a logical outcome of his belief in the
fundamental freedom of the individual as stated in his CRmQUE OF PRACTICAL
REASON (1788). This freedom he did not regard as the lawless freedom of anar-
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that it is the people, not the government, who suffer from war, and they
will choose not to go to war when they can2' 4
Professor Rummel's second-level of analysis explains that democra-
cies are inherently nonviolent because of cross-pressures and democratic
culture. 3°5 Cross-pressures are internal restraints such as internal checks
and balances in the structure of the government that distribute decision-
making authority, as well as social, economic, and political pressures on
the decision-makers. 3°6 Democratic culture fosters nonviolence because it
is a political culture of compromise, negotiation, concession, and toler-
ance that extends such tolerant behavior into the international commu-
nity.307 The third-level of Professor Rummel's analysis involves social
fields and their antifields.30 Social fields are societies where individuals
are free to interact to pursue their own interests and run their own
lives.3° In contrast, antifields are societies that have been turned into or-
ganizations held together by coercion and force to support a totalitarian
political regime.310 In short, democracies are a method of nonviolence,
and nondemocracies are a method of violence. 311
Professors Kagan and Rummel have proven that these two principal
theories on the causes of war-the absence of deterrence and the demo-
cratic peace-are powerful correlatives with the occurrence or non-
occurrence of war. Professor Moore has conformed these principle theo-
ries into a profound theory of war avoidance. After decades of studying
conflict management, use of force, and deterrence theory,312 Professor
Moore has concluded that the cause of major international armed con-
flict is the synergy between a totalitarian regime and the absence of ef-
fective system-wide deterrence.3 13 Stated differently, a major international
chy, but rather as the freedom of self-government, the freedom to obey con-
sciously the laws of the universe as revealed by reason. He believed that the
welfare of each individual should properly be regarded as an end in itself and
that the world was progressing toward an ideal society.... In his treatise PER-
PETUAL PEACE (1795) Kant advocated the establishment of a world federation of
republican states.
Immanuel Kant, MIcRosoFr ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1994).
304. See RUMmL, supra note 301, at 129.
305. Id. at 137-50.
306. Id. at 143-47.
307. Id. at 137-43.
308. Id. at 153.
309. Id. at 153-84.
310. Id. at 191-201.
311. Id. at 210.
312. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, supra note 3, at xlv (describing Professor
Moore's professional credentials and areas of expertise).
313. See Moore, supra note 285, at 840.
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armed conflict will only occur in the presence of both factors, and will
not occur in the absence of either.314
System-wide deterrence, as previously defined, refers to the totality
of positive and negative incentives that discourage the aggressive use of
force. The role of the totalitarian regime in this synergy centers on its
government structure, because the core mechanism responsible for the
democratic peace is the internal structure of governments.3 5 In a previous
study of conflict management, Professor Moore described a political
spectrum of government structures in the form of a horseshoe that ranges
from the totalitarian left of communism through democracies to the total-
itarian right of fascism. 31 6 Figure 4 is a notional depiction of the risk of
war curve when this political spectrum of government is graphed against
the continuum of deterrence.
THE MooRE PARADIGM OF WAR AvoiDANcE
(Figure 4: © 1997 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.)
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This figure depicts that the optimum peace equilibrium exists in the pres-
ence of effective system-wide deterrence and representative forms of
government. Accordingly, the equilibrium is disturbed as the effective-
ness of system-wide deterrence decreases along its continuum to an ab-
314. Id.
315. Id. at 833-34.
316. See NATONAL SEcuRrrY LAW, supra note 3, at 78-79.
1998]
60 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
sence of deterrence, or as the form of government shifts along the politi-
cal spectrum away from representative forms of government to that of a
totalitarian regime.
C. Government Structures and Externalization: A Failure of Deterrence
Within Professor Moore's war avoidance paradigm, the core mecha-
nism responsible for the democratic peace is the internal structure of
governments. 31 7 Four powerful correlatives that are related to these gov-
ernment structures are human rights, economic development, famine
avoidance, and environmental protection. 18 Democratic governments de-
fend human rights, foster economic freedom, prevent famines, and pro-
tect the environment. 3 9 In sharp contrast, totalitarian regimes slaughter
their own people, stymie economic growth, fail to prevent famines, and
destroy the environment. 2°
A study of these correlatives suggests a common causal element
within government structures that explains the operation of both compo-
nents of the war avoidance paradigm. 32' Professor Moore's "theory of
government failure," based upon economic public choice theory, "posits
that government decision makers will generally act rationally, like actors
elsewhere, and that the government setting, as with markets, provides a
series of mechanisms by which these elites and special interest groups
may be able to externalize costs on others. ' '322 The ability of government
decision-makers to externalize costs explains inefficiencies and govern-
ment failure in democracies, and explains massive government failure of
human rights, economic development, famine, and environmental protec-
tion within totalitarian regimes.323
The ability to externalize costs also defines deterrence failure.324 A
totalitarian regime elite such as Saddam Hussein, for example, may per-
sonally benefit from aggressive war if he successfully takes over the oil
fields of Kuwait; however, the risks of the armed aggression are external-
ized to the members of his armed forces. 325 Accordingly, Professor
Moore concludes that "deterrence must be focused on the regime elites
who are the source of the externalization rather than on the country or
317. See Moore, supra note 285, at 833-34.
318. Id. at 826-33.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 833-34.
322. Id. at 834.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 836.
325. Id. at 834-35.
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the peoples of that country as a whole.''326 Enhanced deterrence on re-
gime elites entails new and more effective international legal mechanisms
concerning civil and criminal responsibility.327
V. REVOKING AN AGGREssoR's LICENSE TO KILL
The evolution of the doctrine of equal application illustrates the ori-
gin of its corollary that the combatants of an aggressor state who kill in
furtherance of an unlawful use of force have complete immunity so long
as they kill enemy combatants in accordance with the jus in bello. In the
context of interstate conflicts, the reasoning for the doctrine of equal ap-
plication remains valid. The evolution of the doctrine of equal applica-
tion, however, also demonstrates that international law evolves from cus-
tom and state practice that are driven by social, moral, and political
factors more than by juristic principles. For example, notwithstanding the
historically low threshold of Common Article 2, the international com-
munity's desire to protect those who serve it has already established mili-
tary forces serving the United Nations as an entity legally different than
military forces acting under state authority.
For millennia, the application of the jus ad bellum determined the
application of the jus in bello. With the rise of the nation state and abso-
lute sovereignty, the 1625 seminal treatise DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LiBRI
TRES written by Hugo Grotius caused a change in the interdependence of
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, thus establishing the doctrine of equal
application. In the introduction to his 1956 treatise on war, however, one
scholar echoed the warning of the High Court of England that "there is
always a temptation to turn to the words of great international jurists,
such as Grotius and Hall and others, who wrote some time ago, when
modern conditions did not prevail. ' '3u A number of international law
principles codified by Grotius are now soundly rejected as morally repul-
sive and unlawful. For example, Grotius believed that the jus in bello of
his time condoned the slaughter of women and children, the right to kill
belligerents who have surrendered unconditionally, the rape of women,
and the destruction and pillage of entire cities, even those cities that have
surrendered. 329
326. Id. at 837-38.
327. Id. at 854.
328. Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe v. Bantham S.S. Co. Ltd. (1938),
England, High Court (King's Bench Division), quoted in KorzscH, supra note 2, at 18.
329. See 1 THE LAW OF WAR- A DocuMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 34, 36,
41-42.
1998]
62 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Merely five decades ago, the Charter outlawed aggressive war,
thereby converting overnight the jus ad bellum, a body of law that con-
doned warfare for almost four millennia, to the jus contra helium. The
United Nations has woven the international community into an interde-
pendent system of collective security that obligates the Security Council
to take measures which it decides are necessary to uphold the rule of law
embodied in the jus contra bellum. Revoking an aggressor's right to kill
military forces serving the United Nations is embedded within this new
role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and is embraced
within universally accepted principles of the rule of law, war avoidance,
and deterrence.
A. A Concept Matures: International Law Enforcement
The concept of war and the doctrine of equal application evolved
from the practice of sovereign states based upon the fundamental premise
of the legality of war. War and the aggressive use of force are now uni-
versally accepted as unlawful.3 ° The contemporary jus ad bellum, also
appropriately referred to as the jus contra bellum, is now based upon the
premise of international penal law.33' The international community has
entrusted the Security Council with the responsibility, indeed the obliga-
tion, to enforce this norm of international law. 332
To discharge its obligation under the Charter, the Security Council
may authorize military forces to use all necessary means to respond to
the unlawful, aggressive use of force.333 These peace-enforcers are the in-
ternational community's police force that have been specifically author-
ized, on a case-by-case basis, to enforce the international norm outlawing
the aggressive use of force. Since war essentially began as nothing more
than armed robbery by plundering hordes that evolved into institutional-
ized violence between states, 334 the concept of military forces serving as
international law enforcement is not only authorized now by the Charter
but is historically apropos. During this evolution and institutionalization
of war, intrastate plundering was criminalized and made punishable by
domestic law. Since the Charter has now outlawed interstate plundering,
and it is now time to make punishable all acts associated with such inter-
state plundering.
Drawing upon an analogy with domestic law, the concept of interna-
330. See discussion supra Parts I.A, II.A.
331. See KOTzsCH, supra note 2, at 83-85.
332. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
333. See discussion supra Part H.D.
334. See KoTZSCH, supra note 2, at 25. See also discussion supra Part II.
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tional law enforcement began with the League of Nations.335 The argu-
ment for this concept was increasingly asserted and considerably
strengthened by the Charter's centralization of executive functions in the
Security Council, and the belief grew that United Nations enforcement
actions were more in the nature of a police action.336 Critics argued, how-
ever, that this approach implied that the United Nations was a stronger
governmental system than originally planned, and that military enforce-
ment actions were of the traditional nature of war and should be treated
as such.337 While acknowledging a legal difference in a war between
states and the use of force by the UnitedNations to restrain aggression,
the critics also maintained that to equate such enforcement action to in-
ternational law enforcement was to accept the rule that these United Na-
tions military forces would not be bound by the jus in bello.33 Given the
humanitarian nature of the jus in bello and the desire to have a set of
minimum standards apply during all hostilities, the initiative to treat a
peace-enforcement action by the United Nations as international law en-
forcement lost momentum.339 These concerns are addressed, however, by
the revocation of the aggressor's license to kill proposed by this Article
because the jus in bello remain applicable to both the aggressor and all
United Nations forces. The revocation only entails creating a protected
status for military forces serving the United Nations.
B. A New Modality of Deterrence: Prosecuting the
Individual Combatant
Just as the Security Council must rely upon the military forces of
Member States to enforce the rule of law, totalitarian regime elites must
rely upon their military forces to carry out their unlawful acts of aggres-
sion. Without military forces that obey a regime elite's order to go to
war, armed aggression simply cannot occur. Although the first-level of
system-wide deterrence should be focused on the regime elites who are
able to externalize the cost of aggression onto others,340 the failure to fo-
cus on the military forces of a totalitarian regime is a missed opportunity
to strengthen system-wide deterrence.
Existing international law simply criminalizes the acts of a totalitar-
ian regime's senior leadership, and not the acts of individual combatants,
335. See Ko ,scw supra note 2, at 288.
336. Id. at 289.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 292-93.
339. Id. at 293-94.
340. See Moore, supra note 285, at 837-38.
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for a crime against peace. This existing rule allows a totalitarian regime
elite to externalize his or her costs on those who incur no legal responsi-
bility for their acts that further a criminal act of aggression; conse-
quently, this is a major failure of military and legal deterrence. Effective
system-wide deterrence demands that a negative incentive be applied to
all who have the ability to influence the commission of the unlawful act.
Studies of war criminals from the Second World War and Vietnam
reveal that most war criminals were normal people operating in an orga-
nizational mode who failed to "assess the orders they receive[d] from on
high."'3 4' Those studies that focused on the individual soldier recom-
mended that more training on the laws of war and on how to cope with
the problem of obedience to illegal orders would help prevent war crimes
in the future. 342 Other studies that focused on the military-industrial-
political complex suggested that "[a]t the very least we need a new per-
spective on the rights and duties of sovereign nation states... [and that
what we need concerning the obligation of soldiers to obey superior or-
ders] is some way to evaluate the orders on the part of those at the top
who initiate them. ' 343 All of these studies sought a clear, objective
method for evaluating the lawfulness of an order. Under existing interna-
tional law, when combatants of an aggressor state assess the lawfulness
of an order to attack a military force serving the United Nations, they
must first determine whether the United Nations force is a non-
belligerent or belligerent force, and if the force is a non-belligerent,
whether the scope, duration, and intensity of its use of force makes it a
belligerent military force. This analysis is not a model of clarity. In con-
trast, an international norm that prohibits the use of force against any
military force serving the United Nations properly identified by the use
of distinctive uniforms, insignia, and equipment markings is an unequivo-
cal method to determine the lawfulness of an order to use armed force.
These studies focused on the obligation of members of the armed
forces to disobey unlawful orders. Under the jus in bello, the fact that a
combatant has committed a crime pursuant to the order of a superior
does not relieve him or her from individual criminal responsibility." The
fact that the law was violated pursuant to a superior order is not a de-
fense to a crime unless the accused "did not know and could not reason-
ably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful."' 5
341. DONALD A. WELLS. WAR CRIEs AND LAws OF WAR 108-09 (1984).
342. See id. at 110.
343. See id. at 113.
344. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK. supra note 6, f 6.2.5.5.1; THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, supra note 65, J[ 509.
345. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 65, 509.
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Additionally, it may be a defense if the unlawful order is obeyed under
duress.Y6 In considering the issue of whether a superior order constitutes
a defense, a court should take into consideration:
the fact that obedience to lawful military orders is the duty of
every member of the armed forces; that the latter cannot be ex-
pected, in conditions of war discipline, to weigh scrupulously the
legal merits of the orders received; that certain rules of warfare
may be controversial; or that an act otherwise amounting to a
war crime may be done in obedience to orders conceived as a
measure of reprisal.3 47
To impose the responsibility on members of the armed forces of all states
to consider the lawfulness of the use of force under the jus contra belium
by their respective states is consistent with the existing jus in bello that
imposes an obligation on all members of the armed forces not to follow
unlawful orders. Indeed, the rule of law that it is unlawful to attack mili-
tary forces serving under the authority of the United Nations under all
circumstances is a much clearer objective obligation than that which cur-
rently exists under the jus in bello.
In his study of the Persian Gulf War, Professor Moore stated that
"[a]bove all, we must not accept aggressive war an inevitable part of the
human condition." 34 One conclusion in his discussion for strengthening
a rule of law that will meaningfully sanction aggressive attack is that the
international community must explore a "[tiough-minded application of
sanctions, such as reparations and war crimes trials, against aggression
and grave breaches of the laws of war, in order to end 'costless aggres-
sion,' promote human rights, and particularly to add a personal level of
deterrence to the actions of ruthless regime elites. '349 A tough-minded
extension of his conclusion is to add a personal level of deterrence to the
combatants of the aggressor state.
It may be argued that it is unfair to hold members of the armed
forces of a totalitarian regime accountable for killing military forces serv-
ing the United Nations because the consequences of refusing to obey
such an order may result in torture or death. Such an impassioned plea
was made by General of the Army Wilhelm List in his final statement
before the Nuremberg IMT on behalf of all defendants:
346. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 6, 1 6.2.5.5.1.
347. THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 65, 1 509.
348. JOHN NORTON MOORE. CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 344
(1992).
349. Id. at 341-44.
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To arrive at a just appreciation it is furthermore imperative, to
take due consideration of the inherent circumstance, under which
we were compelled to serve. We were pledged by our oath and
duty of obedience. We were living under the coercion of a dicta-
torship which grew ever more and more demonic and chaotic; a
dictatorship where nevertheless strong tendencies and
countertendencies were predominant, wherein, however the indi-
vidual had but little freedom of action; a dictatorship unconceiv-
able by any outsider, least so by a free citizen of a free democ-
racy. These conditions, as a whole, cannot be grasped without an
insight into the background of all that happened in these days.
Against us stood more or less the same powers who have estab-
lished today in the Balkans a regime of terror, and plan to do the
same in Europe, powers who keep the world in tension, today
opposed by the whole Western Hemisphere. May a kind fate
spare the nation which now holds trial on us from having to fight
a battle as we were forced to fight.315
Notwithstanding the eloquence of his speech, the IMT rejected the de-
fense of superior orders pled by General List and sentenced him to life in
prison.351 Indeed, the record showed that General List had openly dis-
agreed with many of the orders of his superiors, and had been allowed to
retire because of a difference of opinion with Adolf Hitler on tactical
matters.
352
The argument that it would be unfair to require the armed forces of
a totalitarian regime to disobey a superior order to kill military forces
serving the United Nations does not withstand scrutiny for several rea-
sons. First, members of the armed forces of a democracy do not have the
immediate right to refuse to go to war. In the United States, for example,
the refusal of a superior order to deploy overseas can be prosecuted
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 353 Second, international law
already requires the members of the armed forces of a totalitarian regime
to disobey unlawful orders. To require them to disobey an unlawful order
to kill military forces serving the United Nations puts them in no worse
position than to refuse to kill prisoners of war or innocent women and
children.
350. United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFoRE THE NUERNBERG
M=xrARY TRiUNALS 759, 1229 (1950).
351. See id. at 1230-1319.
352. See id. at 1273.
353. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1988).
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Third, all situations may not be as oppressive or coercive as was so
eloquently overstated by General List. One recent scholarly study, for ex-
ample, reveals that the murderers of the Holocaust were ordinary German
soldiers who were not intimidated by their commanders, but who brutal-
ized and murdered Jews voluntarily and zealously despite having been
told they could refuse to kill without fear of retribution.' 54 Perhaps the
existing immunity to kill enemy combatants fosters such a lack of respect
for human life that other war crimes and atrocities are actually easier for
combatants of an aggressor state to commit. Fourth, once deployed and
on the battlefield, the armed forces of a totalitarian regime do not have
to pull the trigger, they can surrender upon meeting the military forces
serving the United Nations knowing that they will be well-treated and re-
turned home at the end of the hostilities. Finally, it may be a defense if
the unlawful order is obeyed under duress. The armed forces of a totali-
tarian regime will have their day in court before they are punished for
any unlawful killing.
This struggle between the responsibilities of a ruler vis-a-vis the du-
ties of the subject is centuries old.35 5 One of Shakespeare's historical
plays, THE LIFE OF KING HENRY THE FITH is a reflection of the political
teachings of his time.356 On the eve of the Battle of Agincourt, King
Henry V circulated in disguise as a common soldier among his troops.
57
354. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER's WILLING EXECurIoNERS: ORDINARY
GERMANs AND THE HOLOCAUST 192-202, 405 (1996).
355. See, e.g., HENRY V, supra note 1, at xxiv-xxv.
356. Id. at xxv. William Shakespeare, born on April 23, 1564, is recognized as one
of England's greatest poets and playwrights. "Throughout the Western world he is held to
be the greatest dramatist ever. His plays communicate a profound knowledge of the well-
springs of human behavior as revealed in his masterful characterizations of a wide gamut
of humanity." He died on April 23, 1616. William Shakespeare, MICRoSOFr ENCARTA '95
(CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1994).357. See SHAKESPEARE. supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 24-201, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 127-41.
The Battle of Agincourt was a decisive English victory during the Hundred
Years' War, fought in France on October 25, 1415, between an English army
under King Henry V of England and a French one under Charles d'Albret, con-
stable of France. Prior to the action, which took place in a narrow valley near
the village of Agincourt .... Henry, a claimant to the French throne, had in-
vaded France and seized the port of Harfleur. At the time of the action, Henry's
army, weakened by disease and hunger, was en route to Calais, from which
Henry planned to embark for England. In the course of the march to Calais the
English force, which numbered about 6000 men, for the most part lightly
equipped archers, was intercepted by d'Albret, whose army of about 25,000
men consisted chiefly of armored cavalry and infantry contingents ...
D'Albret, several dukes and counts, and about 500 other members of the French
nobility were killed; other French casualties totaled about 5000. English losses
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One soldier, Michael Williams, tells the King that soldiers do not know
whether the King's cause is "just and his quarrel honourable. ' 358 A sec-
ond soldier,' John Bates, interrupts to add that soldiers "know enough, if
we know we are the king's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedi-
ence to the king wipes the crime of it out of us. '3 59 Williams continues
that if the King's cause is not just, then the King must answer for the
sins of his soldiers because to disobey the King is against the soldier's
duty. ° The King disagreed, and responded that "[e]very subject's duty is
the king's; but every subject's soul is his own."' 361 Williams and Bates,
still believing the King was a common soldier amongst them, then agreed
with him.362 The words of King Henry V are frequently interpreted for
the proposition that "the subject has a higher authority than the king.'363
Contemporary international law reflects the political teaching echoed
by King Henry V. As previously discussed, under the jus in bello, mem-
bers of the armed forces have an existing international obligation to diso-
bey unlawful orders. Article 8 of the 1945 Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg provides that "[t]he fact that the Defend-
ant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of pun-
ishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires." 3" In 1946,
the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously affirmed the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the IMT.3's
The International Law Commission was subsequently directed by the
numbered fewer than 200 men.... Although Henry returned to England after
Agincourt, his triumph paved the way for English domination of most of France
until the middle of the 15th century.
Battle of Agincourt, MicRosoir ENCARTA '95 (CD-ROM Multimedia Encyclopedia,
1994).
358. SHAKEsPEARE. supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 115-18, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 135.
359. SHAKEsPEARE. supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 119-21, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 135.
360. SHAK srEAa. supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 122-32, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 135-37.
361. SHAKEPEARE, supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, II. 158-59, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 137.
362. SHAKESPEARE. supra note 1, act 4, sc. 1, 11. 166-69, reprinted in HENRY V,
supra note 1, at 138.
363. See, e.g., TREVOR R. GRwFrrHs & TREVOR A. JOSCELYNE, LONGMAN GUIDE TO
SHAKESPEARE QUOTATIONS 183 (1985).
364. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 8, reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CoNFLICS, supra note 4, at 911, 914-15.
365. See Affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles, supra note 245, reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CoNFucTs, supra note 4, at 921.
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General Assembly to codify the principles of international law recognized
in the Charter of the IMT and in its judgments. 366 Principle IV of this
1950 codification amplified this principle to reflect that "[tihe fact that a
person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does
not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a
moral choice was in fact possible to him." 367 The International Law
Commission explained in its commentary that the "true test, which is
found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the
existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible."
On the battlefield, the armed forces of a totalitarian regime engaged in
the aggressive use of force have the moral choice of surrendering to the
military forces serving the United Nations.
The international community has demonstrated its concern over the
safety of those military personnel who serve as its peace-keepers in its
new paradigm of collective self-defense and international law enforce-
ment, even though they may be authorized to use armed force in self-
defense and to accomplish their mission. The discussion in Part III objec-
tively demonstrated an international recognition of an evolving de facto
status of military forces serving the United Nations and the application of
a different set of rules for those forces. While this approach affords max-
imum protection to military personnel serving the international commu-
nity as consensual and coercive peacekeepers, it fails to take the final
step of protecting peace-enforcers. Existing international law must be
changed to protect all military personnel who serve in United Nations
forces, non-belligerents and belligerents alike. Military personnel who
serve as belligerent peace-enforcers risk their lives for those worthy prin-
ciples the international community has enumerated in the Charter, and
there is no rational argument to place a lesser value on the lives of those
civilians who chose to serve the international community in uniform.
Six key principles underpin the rationale for the proposed rule of
law that belligerent military forces serving the United Nations should be
unlawful targets and that the combatants of a belligerent aggressor state
should be prosecuted for killing them:
366. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 923.
367. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, princ. IV, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
374 [hereinafter 1950 Nuremberg Principles], reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CON-
FuCTS, supra note 4, at 923, 924 (emphasis added).
368. Comments of the ILC on the Seven Nuremberg Principles, 1950, supra note 5,
105, reprinted in BAnEY, supra note 5, at 163, 165.
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First, all personnel who serve the international community, mili-
tary as well as civilians, deserve the maximum protection that the
international community has to offer.
Second, a corollary principle to the first, no one, military or civil-
ian, who serves the international community deserves to be a
lawful target.
Third, military personnel who serve the international community
do so under the legal authority of and at the political direction of
the Security Council or the General Assembly.
Fourth, military personnel who serve the international community
are expected to serve as its police force, and they have a duty to
use armed force, when necessary, to accomplish their mission.
Fifth, these military personnel are international personnel who
perform an international function by enforcing the laws of the in-
ternational community. Accordingly, the use of force should be
attributed to the United Nations and not individual states.
Sixth, without these avatars of international peace and security
who implement the Security Council's coercive authority, the in-
ternational community has no enforcement mechanism and inter-
national law. 6 9
The revocation of an aggressor's license to kill military forces serving
the United Nations draws a clear line and deters attacks against those
military forces under all circumstances. In cases of unlawful aggression,
this approach holds the offending state, its head of state, and the individ-
ual soldier who knowingly attacks the military personnel serving the
United Nations all criminally responsible, while otherwise maintaining
the integrity of the jus in bello.
C. Revoking the License: Defining a New Modality of
Personal Deterrence
Revoking an aggressor's license to kill military forces serving the
United Nations can be accomplished by establishing all United Nations
forces as a new category of protected persons that are unlawful targets
under all circumstances. In the case of belligerent United Nations forces,
such a new category of protected persons is a limited exception to the
doctrine of equal application, and must be carefully defined to ensure
that it can be fairly applied to the individual combatants who may be or-
dered to attack military forces serving the United Nations. This approach
has support within the international community. In addition to the previ-
369. Sharp, supra note 9, at 164.
[Vol. 22
REVOKING AN AGGRESSOR'S LICENSE TO KILL
ous challenges to the application of the doctrine of equal application to
military forces serving the United Nations,370 there is international prece-
dent for creating such a category of belligerent forces that are protected
from attack under certain circumstances. Similarly, there is international
precedent for holding individual combatants of a totalitarian regime crim-
inally accountable for complicity when they follow an unlawful order of
their national leaders.
1. International Precedent
Protocol I creates a special category of protected belligerent person-
nel and installations that are not subject to attack provided they are used
solely for defensive purposes and if such an attack may cause severe
losses among the civilian population. Article 56 provides:
Article 56 - Protection of works and installations containing
dangerous forces
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely
dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not
be made the object of attack, even where these objects are mili-
tary objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous
forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian popula-
tion. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of
these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack
if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the
works or installations and consequent severe losses among the ci-
vilian population....
5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour [sic] to avoid locat-
ing any military objectives in the vicinity of the works or instal-
lations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations er-
ected for the sole purpose of defending the protected works or
installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves
be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in
hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to at-
tacks against the protected works or installations and that their
armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile
action against the protected works or installations.
37 1
370. See discussion supra Part ll.E.
371. Protocol I, supra note 114, art. 56, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 30, at 418-19 (emphasis added).
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An attack on these defensive forces is a breach of Protocol I and is de-
fined as a war crime.3 72
Over a hundred states attended each of the four sessions of the Con-
ference that drafted Protocol I, which was signed by forty-six states on
December 12, 1977, when it was first opened for signature. 73 Although
states reserved the right to make declarations and reservations upon rati-
fication, no state made a specific reservation to Article 56(5) at the time
of signature on December 12, 1977. 374 Article 56 has been criticized,
however, by at least one scholar, W. Hays Parks, who describes this pro-
tection provided belligerents and military equipment as radical, unprece-
dented, subject to exploitation, and ambiguous. 375 While this protected
category has been criticized and is limited to a very narrow category of
belligerent forces that are defending works or installations containing
dangerous forces, it is a clear precedent for the willingness of a large
percentage of the international community to carve out a limited excep-
tion to the doctrine of equal application and establish a category of pro-
tected persons who would otherwise be belligerents and lawful targets.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Ge-
nocide 376 holds individual combatants of a totalitarian regime criminally
accountable for complicity when they follow an unlawful order from
their national leaders to kill members of a protected group. Articles I
through I of the 1948 Genocide Convention provide:
Article I
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether commit-
ted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under interna-
tional law which they undertake to prevent and to pumish.
Article II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
372. Protocol I, supra note 114, art. 85, para. 5, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAws OF WAR, supra note 30, at 439.
373. DOCUMETm ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 387, 459-62.
374. Id. at 462-68.
375. See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 202, 213,
216-17 (1990). For a detailed discussion of Professor Parks' criticism of Article 56, see
id. at 202-18.
376. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1948 Genocide Convention], reprinted in Docu.
MENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 158.
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(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group.
Article III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.3 77
Article IV explicitly makes all persons committing the acts listed in Arti-
cle I criminally accountable, "whether they are constitutionally respon-
sible rulers, public officials or private individuals. ' 37
The 1948 Genocide Convention makes no exceptions for persons who act
under coercion or duress.379 During the course of an international armed
conflict, therefore, should individual combatants follow an unlawful order
from their national leadership or their superior commanders to kill mem-
bers of a group protected by Article I, they would be criminally liable
for the act of genocide. These combatants are required by law to disobey
such an unlawful order, regardless of the oppressive nature of their gov-
ernment and whether they are conscripts or volunteers. Similarly, an in-
ternational norm that prohibits the attack of military forces serving the
United Nations under all circumstances would require these individual
combatants to disobey an unlawful order to do so. Thus, if combatants
were ordered into armed conflict by their national leadership and are op-
posed by military forces identified as serving under the authority of the
Untied Nations, they would have an obligation to lay down their weap-
ons and surrender. Such a new rule that protects military forces serving
377. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 376, arts. I-rn, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 158.
378. 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 376, art. IV, reprinted in DOcuMEmS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 158.
379. See 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 376, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 30, at 158.
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the United Nations would place these combatants in no different legal,
moral, or practical dilemma than they are presently in under the 1948
Genocide Convention.
2. Defining a New Category of Protected Persons
Notwithstanding previous initiatives and precedent, a new conven-
tion is required to make such a fundamental shift in the application of in-
ternational law. 3 0 The parameters of the new protected category for
United Nations peace-enforcers defined in this part of the Article judi-
ciously balances three, potentially competing interests. First, the new par-
adigm must afford the maximum protection available under international
law for the military forces acting on behalf of the international commu-
nity. Second, the new paradigm must be established in such a way that it
can be fairly applied to the individual combatants that may be ordered by
their national leadership to attack military forces serving the United Na-
tions. Finally, the new paradigm must not adversely impact the protec-
tions accorded noncombatants by international humanitarian law.
The conceptual approach of this new modality of personal deter-
rence is that military forces serving the United Nations are international
policemen; they protect and serve the international community by main-
taining international peace and security regardless of whether they serve
as peace-keepers or peace-enforcers. Thus, this new modality is limited
to protecting only military forces serving under the authority or direction
of the United Nations. This proposal does not change the application of
the jus in bello to international armed conflicts between states not acting
under the authority of the United Nations.
The most important characteristic of this modality is that it does not
change the application of the existing jus in bello to United Nations
forces or to the combatants of an aggressor state with one exception. It
simply creates a new category of protected persons under international
law-all military forces who serve the international community under the
authority of the United Nations would be unlawful targets under all cir-
cumstances. In practice, this paradigm allows combatants of an aggressor
state to be ordered into armed conflict by their national leadership with-
out questioning the lawfulness of the order. If their national leadership
has engaged in a crime against peace through the unlawful use of force,
380. See supra note 9 for a brief discussion of and reference to a "Draft Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Civilians and Military Forces operating under the authority of the United Nations (Pro-
tocol I)" that would advance and codify a protected status for military forces serving
the United Nations.
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then the individual combatants are not charged with a crime against
peace. When and if the combatants of an aggressor state find themselves
opposed by military forces identified as serving under the authority of
the United Nations, however, they would have an obligation to lay down
their weapons and surrender. Similarly, their commanders would have an
obligation to surrender their units to United Nations forces. These indi-
vidual combatants and their commanders would not have committed a
crime until such time as they have fired upon or otherwise knowingly at-
tacked military forces they have identified as serving under the authority
of the United Nations.
To ensure fairness, military forces serving the United Nations would
not be free to declare an aggressor's military forces hostile and fire upon
them at will without any precondition. The United Nations would have a
corresponding responsibility to provide notice that combatants have an
obligation to surrender to United Nations forces and that it is an interna-
tional crime to attack United Nations forces. This notice should also ex-
plain that combatants who surrender will be humanely treated and repa-
triated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, and that
combatants who attack United Nations forces are subject to prosecution
for war crimes. To implement this responsibility, the United Nations
should first encourage its Member States to adopt a convention that cre-
ates a new protected status for its military peace-keepers and peace-en-
forcers. The United Nations should also actively develop programs that
disseminate this new international norm and require certifications from
states that they have disseminated this rule to its armed forces and civil-
ian population. The goal is to establish this protected status of United
Nations forces as a peremptory norm of customary international law
through wide-spread dissemination and consistent state practice.
During actual hostilities, the United Nations should also provide no-
tice of this international norm to the extent possible under the circum-
stances. This responsibility to provide notice during hostilities does not
require some kind of "bullhorn" announcement by United Nations forces
before each and every engagement, but can be met in a number of ways
without unnecessarily endangering United Nations forces. For example,
notice could be provided through existing military doctrine such as psy-
chological operations.3s8 These operations were extremely effective during
381. Psychological operations are "[pilanned operations to convey selected informa-
tion and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign atti-
tudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives." JoiNT PUB 3-0. DocTRwNE
FOR JOINT OPERATIONS, GL-I1 (1995).
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the Persian Gulf War in encouraging the mass surrender of Iraqi
troops.382 The United States Department of Defense reported on its psy-
chological operations (PSYOP) during the Persian Gulf War as follows:
PSYOP leaflets and radio broadcasts undermined unit morale,
provided instructions on how to surrender, instilled confidence
that prisoners would be treated humanely, and provided advanced
warning of impending air attacks, thus encouraging desertion.
PSYOP objectives were:
" Gain acceptance and support for US operations;
" Encourage Iraqi disaffection, alienation, defection and loss
of confidence;
" Create doubt in Iraqi leadership;
" Encourage non-cooperation and resistance;
" Strengthen confidence and determination of friendly states
to resist aggression; and,
" Improve deterrent value of US forces....
Leaflet, radio and loudspeaker operations were combined
and this combination was key to the success of PSYOP. Leaflets
were the most commonly used method of conveying PSYOP
messages. Twenty-nine million leaflets consisting of 33 different
messages were disseminated in the Kuwait theater of operations..
'Voice of the Gulf' was the Coalition's radio network that
began broadcasting on 19 January from ground based and air-
borne transmitters, 18 hours per day for 40 days. The radio script
was prepared daily and provided news, countered Iraqi propa-
ganda and disinformation, and encouraged Iraqi defection and
surrender.
Loudspeaker teams were used effectively throughout the the-
ater. Each tactical maneuver brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP
teams attached. . . . Loudspeaker teams accompanied units into
Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of prepared surrender
messages.... Iraqi soldiers were encouraged to surrender, were
warned of impending bombing attacks, and told they would be
treated humanely and fairly.3 3
382. See CoNDucr OF THE PERsiAN GuLF WAR. FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 70, app. J at 20-23.
383. Id. app. J at 20-22.
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One Iraqi division commander stated that next to the Coalition's
bombing operations, these psychological operations were the greatest
threat to the morale of his troops.38 His view was validated through in-
terviews with Iraqi prisoners of war.3
To ensure fairness, an element of mens rea is an integral component
of this new paradigm. While all combatants of an aggressor state would
have an obligation to surrender, they would only be held criminally ac-
countable for a knowing attack on military forces serving the United Na-
tions. Accordingly, all military forces serving under the authority of the
United Nations should be properly identified as such through the use of
distinctive uniforms, insignia, and equipment markings. Cooks, logistics
personnel, and combatants who have not taken active part in combat, for
example, would have an obligation to surrender when they found out the
opposition force consisted of military forces serving the United Nations,
but they would not be criminally accountable for their failure to do so.
Not until they knowingly participate in an attack on military forces serv-
ing the United Nations, with either direct fire or over the horizon weapon
systems, would they be criminally accountable under this new paradigm.
As in any other war crimes trial, there will be difficulty in proving who
knowingly committed what act. Similarly, there may be difficulty in
prosecuting large numbers of combatants who attacked United Nations
forces. These difficulties, however, should not deter the international
community from establishing proscriptive norms and taking what action
it can to enforce them. An actual trial is the final safeguard in this new
paradigm that would ensure fairness and would also ensure that a com-
batant is only prosecuted for a knowing attack on United Nations forces.
3. Summary
This proposition of revoking an aggressor's license to kill military
forces serving the United Nations is very circumspect and limited in na-
ture. It imposes obligations on combatants of an aggressor state to sur-
render and refrain from attacking United Nations forces, and imposes
corresponding responsibilities on the United Nations to facilitate their
surrender and to treat them humanely. Such a limited exception to the
doctrine of equal application would allow the jus in bello to remain in-
tact, afford maximum legal protection to United Nations forces, treat
combatants of an aggressor state fairly, and retain the protections ac-
corded noncombatants by international humanitarian law.
384. Id. app. J at 20.
385. Id. app. J at 21.
1998]
78 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
Consider how military and legal deterrence may have been strength-
ened during the Persian Gulf War had this protected status for military
forces serving the United Nations been in place. In addition to focusing
on deterrent options against the Iraqi leadership, system-wide deterrence
could have been strengthened by also providing positive and negative in-
centives to the Iraqi combatants. The psychological operations efforts of
the Coalition forces could have included notice that Iraqi combatants
have an obligation to surrender to United Nations forces, that those who
surrender will be humanely treated and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of active hostilities, that it is an international crime to attack
United Nations forces, and that combatants who attack United Nations
forces are subject to prosecution for war crimes. Such a notice could
have given the Iraqi combatants an additional, personal incentive to sur-
render and an additional, personal disincentive to continue fighting. There
is no evidence to suggest that the addition of these incentives would have
made surrender less likely. To the contrary, the effectiveness of the psy-
chological operations suggests that the Iraqi combatants would have been
more likely to surrender. The lesson of the Persian Gulf War is that sys-
tem-wide deterrence can be strengthened by revoking an aggressor's li-
cense to kill military forces serving the United Nations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AN) FINAL REFLECTIONS
During the twentieth century, the international community has in-
creasingly relied upon the rule of law to rid humanity of the bloodshed
and brutality of war that has plagued the past four millennia. Most nota-
bly, the Charter of the United Nations has clearly outlawed the aggres-
sive use of force, while maintaining a state's inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense. Through the Charter's paradigm of collective
self-defense, the international community has conferred upon the Security
Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security, and the obligation to either make recommendations or
take coercive measures to maintain or restore international peace and se-
curity. These coercive measures were specifically intended by the drafters
of the Charter to include the authority of the Security Council to use
armed force against an aggressor state.
To enforce this rule of law, the Security Council must rely upon the
military forces of the Member States of the United Nations. While the
international community universally accepts that non-belligerent peace-
keepers are protected persons and unlawful targets, these peace-keepers
are normally deployed in areas of ongoing hostilities and are authorized
to use force in self-defense and mission accomplishment. Tragically, this
authorized use of force on behalf of the international community-under a
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rote application of existing international law-creates the paradoxical situ-
ation where these peace-keepers may become belligerents and lawful
targets. Even more untenable is the situation when military forces are ex-
pected, and required by their respective states, to serve as international
policemen to fight aggression, but are allowed to be lawfully targeted by
the combatants of an aggressor state.
This contemporary application of international law is unacceptable
because it is anathema to fundamental principles of criminal law and de-
terrence, and is antithetical to the international community's demonstrated
desire to protect military forces serving the United Nations. It is time for
the international community to openly embrace the concept that military
forces who serve under the authority of the United Nations are interna-
tional policemen and unlawful targets under all circumstances, regardless
of whether they serve as consensual peace-keepers or belligerent peace-
enforcers. These men and women protect the international community
from threats to international peace and security, and they deserve the
maximum protection that can be established under international law.
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